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ABSTRACT
Devarakonda Venkata Naga, Siva Ramakrishna. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2015.
Founders’ Credentials and the Performance of Startups. Major Professors: Thomas H.
Brush and Jeffrey J. Reuer.
In this dissertation, I unpack startup founders’ characteristics and investigate their
impact on the performance of young high-tech startups. I distinguish specific aspects of
founders that convey their unobservable quality and human capital, and advance new
arguments that deepen our understanding about founders’ role in shaping the prospects and
performance of young high-tech startups. In particular, I examine founders’ distinct
technical and entrepreneurial credentials that have the effect of facilitating important
milestones for startups, such as strategic alliances and initial public offering, which ensure
startups’ growth and survival. Further, I also investigate the contingent effects of these
credentials of startup founders on the degree of uncertainty that prevails for potential
alliances partners and investors about startups’ underlying quality. In three essays that
comprise this dissertation, I find evidence that startup founders’ scientific and
entrepreneurial credentials promote favorable cooperative commercialization agreements
for startups with alliances partners and accelerate their initial public offerings. I also find
evidence that these distinct credentials of founders are more useful when there is higher
uncertainty about startups’ quality. These findings have important implications for research
in strategy and entrepreneurship about the significance and enduring impact of startups’
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founding teams on startups’ growth and performance. The arguments and evidence also
provide many practical implications for high-tech entrepreneurs and resource providers.
In the first study, I propose three distinct credentials of startup founders and explore
their impact on startups’ alliance formation in the context of market for ideas and
technologies. In particular, I unpack three distinct credentials of startup founders -scientific stars, employees of prominent incumbents, and successful founders, and show
that they influence the formation of cooperative commercialization agreements for startups.
Further, I develop the argument that the impact of founders’ credentials is contingent on
other signals that can effectively convey the underlying quality of startups’ quality to
potential collaborators and mitigate uncertainty. I find evidence that a startup’s published
patent application diminishes the positive effect of founders’ credentials on formation of
cooperative agreements with incumbents.
In the second study, I examine an underexplored dimension of alliance contracting,
in particular the payment structures that parties negotiate for their high-tech partnerships,
and develop hypotheses about the remedial role of startup founders’ credentials in
obtaining favorable payment structures for startups within collaborative commercialization
with incumbents. Specifically, I show that founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials positively shape the proportion of upfront payments that startups can obtain
from their licensees, rather than deferred and contingent payments that routinely feature in
these transactions. More importantly, I provide evidence for the intuitive notion that
scientific and entrepreneurial credentials would complement each other. Finally, I also
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suggest that the positive effects of these two distinct founders’ credentials on the proportion
of upfront payments will vary based upon startups’ venture development stages.
In the final study, I develop hypotheses about the role of founders’ credentials on
startups’ rate of going public. I propose that startup founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials play a pivotal role in positively influencing the startup’s ability to go public.
Specifically, I suggest that startups that have a scientific star or a founder with prior IPO
experience on their founding team are able to go public faster. I also suggest that the effects
of founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial credentials are contingent on other potential
means through which startups can credibly convey their overall quality and prospects. In
particular, given the fact that high-tech startups are usually backed by venture capitalists
and the quality of their VC affiliations produce information on startups’ quality and
prospects, I suggest that prominent VC affiliations moderate the effects of founders’
credentials on startup’s rate of going public.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I unpack startup founders’ characteristics and investigate their
impact on the performance of young high-tech startups. I distinguish specific aspects of
founders that convey their unobservable quality and human capital, and advance new
arguments that deepen our understanding about founders’ role in shaping the prospects and
performance of young high-tech startups. In particular, I examine founders’ distinct
technical and entrepreneurial credentials that have the effect of facilitating important
milestones for startups, such as strategic alliances and initial public offering, which ensure
startups’ growth and survival. Further, I also investigate the contingent effects of these
credentials of startup founders on the degree of uncertainty that prevails for potential
alliances partners and investors about startups’ underlying quality. In three essays that
comprise this dissertation, I find evidence that startup founders’ scientific and
entrepreneurial credentials promote favorable cooperative commercialization agreements
for startups with alliances partners and accelerate their initial public offerings. I also find
evidence that these distinct credentials of founders are more useful when there is higher
uncertainty about startups’ quality. These findings have important implications for research
in strategy and entrepreneurship about the significance and enduring impact of startups’
founding teams on startups’ growth and performance. The arguments and evidence also
provide many practical implications for high-tech entrepreneurs and resource providers.
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1.1

Theoretical Background and Positioning
Startups are subject to a high degree of uncertainty about their prospects and are

liable to suffer failure on account of their lack of resources (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965;
Freeman et al., 1983; Singh et al., 1986; Bruderl and Rudolf, 1990). In particular, when
startups are in their early stages of founding they face a severe shortage of resources such
as financial capital, man-power, and relationships with potential suppliers and customers
(e.g., Penrose, 1959; Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), which affects their
prospects for growth and survival. Given that startups face resource constraints, the
question arises as to how startups can yet overcome their susceptibility to failure, and rather
achieve growth.
Prior research emphasizes that startup founders can play a highly significant role in
shaping growth opportunities for startups (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990;
Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1994). Specifically, startup founders’ knowledge, skills,
experience, know-how and expertise are part of startups’ initial endowments, and critically
determine the performance and survival of startups (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994). Founders’
expertise and know-how widen the strategic scope for startups and influence the
subsequent development of startups (e.g., Boeker, 1989). In its initial stages, a startup’s
distinctive tangible and intangible capabilities and its capacity to obtain superior
performance largely correlates with the skills and competence of its founding team
members (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1994; Colombo and
Grilli, 2005). In particular, startup founders’ industry specific know-how and
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entrepreneurial know-how and experience are positively related to performance and
survival of startups (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994).
While the above ideas broadly suggests that founders contribute their know-how
and expertise to their startups and have a strong bearing on the performance of startups, a
separate body of research also strongly suggests that startups largely rely on strategic
alliances and outside investors to access complementary resources and capital to promote
startups’ growth and performance (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Gulati, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999;
Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Whereas previous research
on startup founders is largely focused on their impact of startup performance, there is very
limited research and evidence (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) about how
founders contribute to startups’ strategic alliance partnerships and financing strategies.
Given the significance of founders in shaping startups’ strategic growth and development,
there is a need for understanding how and to what extent founders affect outcomes for
startups in the alliance and capital market context.
To begin with, startups’ ability to access complementary resources and capital
through strategic alliances and capital markets is very limited for several reasons. First
startups usually lack track records (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Baum et al., 2000) that can
credibly provide information to potential collaborators about startups’ proprietary ideas
and innovations. Collaborative partnerships between startups and incumbents may fail to
occur because incumbents find it costly to assess startups’ underlying resources before
making commitments to develop startups’ ideas and technologies (e.g., Stigler, 1961;
Rangan, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Likewise, potential investors may be wary
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about the prospects of startups’ resources in the absence of credible information (e.g., Amit
et al., 1990; Hsu, 2006). Such information costs arise in part because early stage startups
wish to avoid disclosing proprietary information that might be misappropriated (Arrow,
1962), and they have incentives to overstate their ideas, other intangible resources, and
their prospects (e.g., Gulati, 1999, Hsu, 2006). In effect, information asymmetries
surrounding the prospects of early stage startups and innovators’ proposals (e.g., Mody,
1993; Pisano, 1997; Lerner and Merges, 1998) escalates the risk of adverse selection for
outsiders, and the classical ‘lemons’ problem ensues for potential alliance partners and
investors (e.g., Akerlof, 1970).
While startups’ generally poor information conditions create frictions and diminish
opportunities for startups to attract potential alliance partners and financing from outside
investors (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013), startups can overcome
informational frictions by taking actions that credibly convey information about their
quality, and yet are costly for other startups to imitate (Spence, 1973). For instance, startups
can reduce uncertainty about their quality and produce information on their underlying
asset quality and prospects by obtaining the affiliation of prominent outsiders such as VCs
who are actively involved in financing high-risk startup activity (e.g., Megginson and
Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). However, startups also have to incur
significant cost to gain the endorsement of prominent VCs as they have to offer equity to
the VCs, agree to stringent control and monitoring (e.g., Hsu, 2004).
Similarly, startups can partner with prominent alliance partners to enhance their
performance (e.g., Baum et al., 2000) and signal their quality to outsiders (e.g., Stuart et

5

al., 1999). However, partnering with prominent partners may not be easy for startups,
particularly those with radical innovations, because prominent partners are likely to be very
selective in their choice of partners (e.g., Li et al., 2008; Ozmel et al., 2013). As a
consequence, startups may incur loss of time while establishing alliances with prominent
partners, or contract with them on less attractive terms (e.g., Danzon et al., 2005).
Additionally, while startups can rely on the quality of their resource base and patent stocks
to obtain resources from outsiders (e.g., Wagner and Cockburn, 2010; Hsu and Ziedonis,
2013), assembling these firm-level resources may take considerable time and resources,
and may also not credibly reduce uncertainty for outside investors about the potential
market prospects of startups’ technologies (e.g., Long, 2002; Gans et al., 2008).
Given these strategic considerations for startups, I depart from previous research
about the impact of startup founders on startups’ performance, and rather advance the idea
that startup founders’ distinctive human capital has a much broader role for startups in the
context of startups’ strategic alliance and financing strategies. To being with, I argue that
while a founder’s human capital is private information, potential collaborators and
investors in alliance and capital markets can learn about founders’ human capital by
evaluating their career track records and accomplishments. Noting that human capital and
know-how are distributed heterogeneously among individuals (e.g., Haltiwanger and
Waldman, 1985; Teece, 2003), and a few are more sophisticated in their ability to combine
knowledge and create novel ideas, I further suggest that some startup founders are likely
to have attained superior quality know-how and expertise that is costly-to-imitate for others
(Spence 1973, 2002).
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To set up the above argument, I build upon ideas expounded in the economics of
information concerning the risk of adverse selection and its remedies (e.g., Akerlof, 1970;
Spence, 1973) and suggest that founders’ superior credentials serve as credible signals for
the quality of their unobservable human capital and know-how. These credentials can
therefore function as effective means for outsiders to reduce their risk of adverse selection
while making decisions on resource commitments to startups. Inasmuch as there is
uncertainty about startups’ underlying quality and the prospects of their innovations,
outsiders can rather evaluate startup founders’ credentials and track records to draw
credible inferences about startups’ quality. Accordingly, founders’ distinct credentials that
relate to their unobservable industry-specific competence, as well as their unobservable
entrepreneurial and management competence, can function as credible signals for
outsiders. It is to be noted here that while the quality of founders’ technical and scientific
credentials establish their industry-specific experience and competence, founders’
entrepreneurial accomplishments and credentials attest to their entrepreneurial and
management competence.
1.2

Evidence from Three Studies
The first essay, presented in chapter 2, proposes three distinct credentials of startup

founders and explores their impact on startups’ alliance formation in the context of market
for ideas and technologies. Early stage startups typically try to obtain resources from
external agents (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Shane and Cable, 2002) and are devoid of track
records (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002) that enhance their visibility and establish credibility
to resource providers. Potential investors and collaborators face difficulties locating and
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selecting early startups lacking credible track records (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004).
In this regard, I unpack three distinct credentials of startup founders -- scientific stars,
employees of prominent incumbents, and successful founders -- that are costly for other
founders to attain and which enable transactions with firms by reducing their costs of
search and selection. Further, I develop the argument that the impact of founders’
credentials is contingent on other signals that can effectively convey the underlying quality
of startups’ quality to potential collaborators and mitigate uncertainty. I find evidence that
a startup’s published patent application diminishes the positive effect of founders’
credentials on formation of cooperative agreements with incumbents. The main theoretical
contribution is that startup founders’ credentials serve as signals of their unobservable
human capital and play an influential role in shaping early stage commercialization
opportunities for startups by signaling the value of their latent ideas and technologies. The
evidence therefore shows the relevance of founder effects in promoting cooperative
commercialization, particularly in the earliest stages of the firm’s technological
development when uncertainty is substantial.
This paper complements research on market for ideas and collaborative R&D
partnerships (e.g., Stuart, 1998; Gulati. 1999) and contributes broadly to research on
alliances and partner selection (Li et al., 2008; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Diestre and
Rajagopalan, 2012), by suggesting that founders’ credentials play an important role in
addressing information asymmetries and reducing risks of adverse selection faced by
incumbent firms and enabling transactions with upstream suppliers of technologies.
Founders’ credentials therefore can foster the division of innovative labor and cooperative
commercialization opportunities for startups.
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This study also contributes to research on founding teams in enhancing
performance and growth prospects of entrepreneurial firms. Prior streams of research
examined the effects of founders’ human capital and networks on performance of
entrepreneurial ventures (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997; Baum
et al., 2000; Colombo and Grili, 2005; Delmar and Shane, 2006; Eesley and Roberts, 2012)
and alliance formation (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart et al., 2007; Hallen,
2008; Luo et al., 2009), and this study complements prior research by arguing a signaling
role for founders’ unobservable human capital (e.g, Mincer, 1958; Coff, 1997).
Specifically, this paper explicates three distinct credentials of founders and shows that they
address information asymmetries and the risk of adverse selection surrounding an early
stage startup’s ideas and technologies.
The second essay, appearing in Chapter 3, examines an underexplored dimension
of alliance contracting, in particular the payment structures that parties negotiate for their
high-tech partnerships, and develops hypotheses about the remedial role of startup
founders’ credentials in obtaining favorable payment structures for startups during
collaborative commercialization with incumbents. Specifically, I investigate two distinct
credentials of startup founders and argue that they play an instrumental role in positively
shaping the proportion of upfront payments that startups can obtain from their licensees,
rather than deferred and contingent payments that routinely feature in these transactions.
Finally, because high-tech startups are usually venture backed (e.g., Sahlman, 1990;
Gompers and Lerner, 2001) and startups’ venture activity produces information on
startups’ progress, I also suggest that the positive effects of these two distinct founders’
credentials on the proportion of upfront payments that startups receive will vary based upon
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startups’ venture activity. In particular, I suggest that the positive effect of founders’
technical credentials on upfront proportion will be prominent for a startup in early stages
of venture rounds, while the positive effect of founders’ entrepreneurial credentials in the
form of prior IPOs will be more pronounced during later stages of venture development.
At a broad level, essay 2 contributes to literature in strategy and entrepreneurship
by examining the signaling role of founders’ credentials in enhancing the value attained
from their ideas and innovative capabilities from cooperative commercialization
arrangements. Specifically, it investigates an underexplored aspect of startup performance
– payment structures in cooperative agreements – and contributes to the research on market
for ideas and collaborative R&D partnerships by suggesting that founders’ credentials play
an important role in reducing risks of adverse selection for prospective partners and shaping
favorable compensation structures for startups. Importantly, it shows how founders’
technical and entrepreneurial credentials are distinctive yet complement one another.
By showing how founders’ credentials shape payment structures and the allocation
of risk in partnerships involving startups, this study contributes to an emerging stream of
work on the design of alliances which has so far emphasized contract complexity and
specific provisions geared to partners’ control and coordination concerns (e.g., Luo, 2002;
Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Mesquita and Brush, 2008;
Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2010). I present alliance payment
structures as an additional means by which incumbent firms and startups allocate risk
between them, and the evidence indicates that founders’ credentials can enable startups to
bear less risk when they engage in cooperative commercialization transactions with
incumbents.
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The paper also advances research in strategy and entrepreneurship by showing the
importance of founder effects and the value of credentialing mechanisms in strategic
alliances. Prior research has examined the roles of inter-organizational relationships (e.g.,
Gulati, 1999, Ozmel et al., 2013), affiliations with prominent venture capitalists (e.g., Hsu,
2006), technological track records (e.g., Stuart, 1998; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), and
experience of top management team members (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996)
in facilitating collaborations for startups. It therefore complements this research by
showing how founders’ credentials shape payment structures and the allocation of risk in
partnerships involving startups.
In Essay 3, presented in Chapter 4, I develop hypotheses about the role of founders’
credentials and track records on startups’ rate of going public. I propose two distinct
credentials of startup founders and suggest that they play a pivotal role in positively
influencing the startup’s ability to go public. Specifically, I suggest that startups that have
a scientific star or a founder with prior IPO experience on their founding team are able to
go public faster. I also suggest that the effects of founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials are contingent on other potential means through which startups can credibly
convey their overall quality and prospects. Notably, given the fact that high-tech startups
are generally backed by venture capitalists (VCs) (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and
Lerner, 2001) and the quality of their VC affiliations produce information on the startups’
quality, I suggest that prominent VC affiliations moderate the effects of founders’
credentials on startup’s rate of going public.
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At a broad level, Essay 3 contributes to research in strategy and entrepreneurship
on startups’ IPO timing decisions and IPO performance. Prior research has investigated the
role of startups’ interorganizational relationships and endorsements (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Chang, 2004) and the top management team’s experience (e.g., Beckman and
Burton, 2008) and prestige (e.g., Certo et al., 2001) on the IPO timing and performance of
startups. I complement this stream of research by showing how specific aspects of
founders’ credentials that are indicative of their scientific and entrepreneurial
accomplishments are likely to have a strong bearing on startups’ IPOs.
Second, I complement prior research by showing the contingency between startup
founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments and prominence of startup VC
affiliation on startups’ ability to go public. Prior research has examined how founders’
human capital and reputation affect the funding startups receive from VCs (e.g., Hsu, 2006;
Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). Other studies have shown how receiving backing by venture
capitalists can help firms go public (Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Chang,
2004; Ozmel et al., 2013). I build upon and extend this research by demonstrating the
importance of founder effects in shaping the timing of firms’ IPOs, and showing that
founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial attainments matter to a greater extent when startups
cannot convey their prospects to potential investors in IPO markets on account of less
prominent VC affiliations.
I also contribute to literature in strategy and entrepreneurship that has examined the
role of founders on the performance of startups. Specifically, I explore the role of founder
effects on startups’ ability to go for an IPO and achieve faster access to public equity
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markets.

The

findings

suggest

that

founders’

scientific

and

entrepreneurial

accomplishments play an important role in effecting faster IPOs for startups. In this
manner, I complement prior research (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990, 1996;
Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Colombo and Grilli, 2010) which suggests the significance of
founder’s experience and competence on the growth and performance of entrepreneurial
ventures.
1.3

Conclusion
In summary, I draw insights from economics of information concerning the risk of

adverse selection and its remedies (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973) and suggest that
founders’ superior credentials serve as credible signals for the quality of their unobservable
human capital and know-how. I show that founders’ distinct technical and entrepreneurial
credentials facilitate important milestones for startups, such as strategic alliances and initial
public offering, which ensure startups’ growth and survival. I also show the contingent
effects of these credentials of startup founders on the degree of uncertainty that prevails for
potential alliances partners and investors about startups’ underlying quality. Put together,
the three studies provide new evidence about the signaling role of startup founders’
credentials and enhance the theoretical and empirical understanding about the role of
founders in shaping growth prospects and performance of startups.
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CHAPTER 2. FOUNDERS’ CREDENTIALS AND FORMATION OF
COOPERATIVE COMMERCIALIZATION AGREEMENTS FOR STARTUPS
2.1

Introduction
Early-stage startups require financial resources and complementary capabilities

develop their nascent ideas and innovations (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965). For example, early
stage to startups that possess new technologies or ideas for new products - such as a movie
script, mechanical device, a program, or a method for a drug - require financial capital,
supplies, and knowledge about useful complementary methods and resources in order to
enter product markets and make profitable gains from their discovered ideas and
technologies (e.g., Teece, 1986). However, during their early stages, startups lack the track
records that enable them to access capital and factor markets (e.g., Rao, 1994). Startups
therefore face challenges in their gestation stages assembling organizational resources for
developing their discoveries and ideas (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart et al., 1999).
As

a

consequence,

early

stage

startups

can

engage

in

cooperative

commercialization strategies with established incumbents to overcome these impediments
to their development and growth (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Gans and Stern, 2003; Hsu, 2006).
Cooperative commercialization strategies between startups and established incumbents
occur as technology licensing and/or strategic alliances, and can be an efficient alternative
to internal development (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Williamson, 1991), allowing startups to
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garner resources and capabilities from established incumbents and quickly translate their
embryonic ideas and technologies into profitable outcomes (e.g., Greis, Dibner, and Bean,
1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 2010). For
example, early stage startups in the biotechnology industry establish cooperative
relationships with incumbents through various forms of strategic alliances (e.g., Baum and
Silverman, 2004; Stuart et al., 2007), which enable startups to exploit their technological
know-how and expertise by combining their ideas and technologies with the
commercialization capabilities of incumbents (e.g., Pisano 1990; Alfonso and
Gambardella, 1990).
However, the formation of cooperative agreements between early stage startups and
incumbents is hampered by the risk of adverse selection because of the information
asymmetries surrounding the prospects of early stage startups and innovators’ proposals
(e.g., Mody, 1993; Pisano, 1997; Lerner and Merges, 1998). Early stage startups usually
lack track records (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Baum et al., 2000) that can credibly provide
information to potential collaborators about startups’ proprietary ideas and innovations
(e.g., Amit et al., 1990; Hsu, 2006). Collaborative partnerships between startups and
incumbents may fail to occur because incumbents find it costly to judge startups’
underlying resources before making commitments to develop startups’ ideas and
technologies (e.g., Stigler, 1961; Rangan, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Such
information costs arise in part because early stage startups wish to avoid disclosing
proprietary information that might be misappropriated (Arrow, 1962), and they have
incentives to overstate their ideas, other intangible resources, and their prospects (e.g.,
Gulati, 1999, Hsu, 2006).
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Previous research in strategy and entrepreneurship has emphasized the various
ways in which startups can mitigate the effects of informational asymmetries on their
ability to transact with investors and strategic partners. For example, early stage startups
can pursue actions which credibly signal their underlying quality, thereby facilitating
exchanges in various market contexts (e.g., Lee, 2001; Certo, 2003; Sanders & Boivie,
2004; Dewally & Ederington, 2006). For instance, evidence suggests that in high-tech
industries an innovative early stage startup can affiliate with prominent venture capitalists
(VCs), incur discounted valuations (Hsu, 2004), and distinguish itself from other startups
to attract cooperative agreements with partners (e.g., Hsu, 2006). Other research suggests
that startups can convey signal the value of their resources and market prospects by
developing positions in networks (e.g., Nicholson et al., 2005; Ozmel et al., 2013) or
through patenting activities (e.g., Long, 2002, Haussler et al., 2009).
For startups, however, these signals can take considerable time to develop. In this
paper, I build upon and extend this research by suggesting that founders’ credentials are
valuable in conveying information about startups’ quality and their commercialization
prospects to would-be partners. During their early stages, startups’ plans, ideas, and
innovations are a direct result of their founders’ intangible skills and human capital (e.g.,
Klepper, 2001; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Indeed, when startups are in their earliest stages
of development, incumbents can determine the attractiveness of an early stage startup’s
latent innovations based on the credentials and track records of their founders (e.g., Amit,
Glosten, and Muller, 1990; Rao, 1994; Venkataraman, 1997). This suggests that even in
the presence of substantial uncertainty and absence of other signals (e.g., a technological
track record through patenting,

networks, etc.), early stage ventures might still be
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successful at forming transactions with partners. Specifically, prospective collaborators
can distinguish early stage startups on the basis of their founders’ professional
accomplishments and track records (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002).
In this paper, I therefore build upon ideas expounded in the economics of
information about the risk of adverse selection and its remedies (e.g., Akerlof, 1970;
Spence, 1973) in the context of the market for ideas and technologies in order to develop
hypotheses about the remedial role of founders’ credentials in promoting collaborative
commercialization opportunities for early stage startups. More specifically, I unpack three
distinct credentials of founders and discuss their positive effects at the earliest stages of
new venture development when startups are otherwise devoid of any track record
indicating their type to prospective collaborators.
In the empirical context of this study involving startups in biopharmaceutical
industry, cooperative commercialization agreements between startups and incumbents are
ubiquitous (e.g., Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; Stuart et al., 2007). Moreover,
early stage startup activity is largely driven by intangible technical and human capital of
founders which is nevertheless unobservable to outsiders (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Zucker and
Darby, 1996). In this regard, founders who attained scientific star credentials, favorable
employment credentials such as prior employment with prominent firms, or prior
entrepreneurial success in the public equity markets can play important roles in enabling
cooperative commercialization for early stage startups with incumbent partners. Moreover,
I also argue and show that these three distinct credentials of founders can be especially
beneficial for a startup when it lacks a technological track record, such as a patent
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publication that conveys information about the early stage technological activity of the
startup.
Broadly, my theoretical contribution therefore lies in investigating the role of three
distinct founders’ credentials for cooperative commercialization and in demonstrating their
contingent effects based on the institutional mechanism of patent publication. My study
extends research on market for ideas and technologies as well as interfirm collaboration in
several ways. First, it contributes to research on market for ideas and technologies and
collaborative R&D partnerships by suggesting that founders’ credentials play an important
role in reducing risks of adverse selection for incumbents and enabling transactions with
suppliers of technologies, thus facilitating the division of innovative labor and cooperative
commercialization opportunities for startups (e.g., Arora et al., 2001).
Second, for research in strategy and entrepreneurship concerning interfirm
collaboration, this study underscores the importance of founder effects and value of
credentialing mechanisms in these markets. Previous research has examined the roles of
inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Gulati, 1999, Ozmel et al., 2013), affiliations with
prominent venture capitalists (e.g., Hsu, 2006), technological track records (e.g., Stuart,
1998; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), and experience of top management team members
(e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) in facilitating alliances for new ventures. I
therefore complement this research by showing how founders’ credentials shape alliance
formation for early stage startups.
Finally, I contribute to research on resource-based theory (RBT) (e.g., Penrose,
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and emerging stream of research about the role of
founders’ experience and human capital (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996;
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Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Chandler and Hanks, 1998) by arguing and demonstrating that
the credentials of founders can also be instrumental for startups by offering signaling
services (e.g., Brush et al., 2001; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013) that shape cooperative
commercialization agreements during their founding stages.
2.2

Theory and Hypotheses
High-tech startups that possess good ideas and technologies but lacking

demonstrative track records of their own can overcome information barriers to trade
inherent to market for ideas and technologies in various ways. Specifically, good quality
startups can separate from inferior startups through signals that efficiently convey
information about the unobservable features of their superior ideas by engaging in actions
that are costly for others to imitate (Spence, 1973). Spence (1973) originally proposed the
role of signaling mechanisms in ameliorating the risk of adverse selection and facilitating
exchange between agents. Many studies in management and economics literatures
elucidate various signaling mechanisms which can enable entrepreneurs and startups to
obtain necessary resources of growth in a wide range of market settings (e.g., Amit,
Glosten, and Muller, 1990; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart
et al., 1999; Certo, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Levitas and McFayden, 2009;
Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
While these signaling mechanisms promote exchanges and provide access to
external resources for high-tech startups during their various phases of growth, the
credentials of founders can also be instrumental in facilitating cooperative exchanges.
Specifically, a set of founder credentials that is costly to earn for other startup founders can
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positively shape the beliefs of incumbents about the startup’s underlying nature. Spence
(1973, 2002) suggests that in the labor market employers can ex ante distinguish abilities
and productivity levels of job applicants based on their educational credentials. Because
the costs to acquiring relevant educational credentials vary with underlying abilities of
individuals, applicants who are less capable than their peers incur substantially higher costs
to acquire credentials that are valuable signals for the employer. Analogously, in the market
for ideas scientific and technological track records of individuals are indicative of the
unobservable attributes of their abilities and know-how (e.g., Spence, 2002; Luo, Koput,
and Powell, 2009). Specifically, in markets that involve the exchange of innovations and
knowledge, individuals with higher levels of scientific achievements and technical
endeavors are viewed as possessing superior productive skills and know-how (e.g., Burton,
Sorenson, and Beckman, 2002), and startups founded by them are more likely to be widely
visible in the market and considered as comprising good ideas (e.g., Burton, Sorenson, and
Beckman, 2002).
The research hypotheses in this study develop a theory of founders’ credentials and
propose three distinct credentials of high-tech startups’ founders – successful
entrepreneurs, former employees of prominent firms, and scientific stars – that credibly
convey information about the quality of their ideas, technologies, and prospects and
facilitate commercialization opportunities for startups. Moreover, given the importance of
patenting activity in high-tech industries, I discuss how a published patent application
increases the chances of striking a deal for a startup firm by enhancing its visibility in the
market and conveying information about its ideas. Further, I suggest that credentials of
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startup founders that are not easily attainable for others substitute for the lack of a published
patent application, so startups that do not yet have a published patent application can use
their founders’ credentials as a bootstrap to overcome the risk.
2.2.1

Scientific Stars
When the characteristics of ideas and technologies of early stage high-tech startups

are hard to observe and measure, distinguishable scientific and technical track records of
their founders help early stage high-tech startups convey information about the value of
their intangible ideas to prospective partners. In particular, because early stage startups
usually lack the experience and necessary track records (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999), in the
initial stages of a startup’s development, founders’ observable scientific credentials that
are costly for other startup founders to imitate can enable potential partners, such as
established incumbents, to adjust their beliefs about the latent quality of the startup’s
technological features.
Startup innovators create new ideas and develop products and services by
combining existing knowledge (e.g., Schumpeter, 1934; Henderson and Clark, 1990).
While individuals can be limited in their capacity to process information and assimilate
knowledge (Simon, 1945), individuals with superior knowledge and abilities are more
likely to perceive opportunities and advance innovations. In high-tech industries such as
biotechnology, semiconductors, and computer software, good quality ideas are formulated
by integrating technical knowledge to solve practical problems (e.g., Nelson, 1959), and
usually individuals with deeper theoretical and technical knowledge are more likely to
possess superior inventive abilities and be successful at devising better innovations (e.g.,
Schmoolker and Brownlee, 1962; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
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Typically, innovative abilities are distributed heterogeneously among individuals (e.g.,
Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985; Teece, 2003), and a few are more sophisticated in their
ability to combine knowledge and create novel ideas. In any industry, these exceptional
individuals are likely to be more competent at producing innovative approaches for
designing products and services (Teece, 2003). Specifically, they pioneer the development
of new ideas and technologies and play a key role in fostering innovation (e.g., Zucker and
Darby, 1996; Nelson and Winter, 2002).
Given the fact that high-tech startups are largely built on scientific and technical
ideas (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Sorenson and Fleming, 2004), founding
members’ scientific and technical accomplishments and depth of know-how strongly shape
the subsequent quality of startups’ innovations as well as the startups’ success in
transforming ideas into commercializable products and services (e.g., Zucker and Darby,
1996; Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; Santoro and McGill, 2005). Superior
innovators can have a greater impact on the direction of innovation (Tushman, 1977), and
are more likely to develop novel ideas and technologies that can contribute to the
performance of their firms as well as their exchange partners (e.g., Simon, 1991; Lavie and
Rosenkopf, 2006). So, high-tech startups that are founded by individuals having an
outstanding scientific and technical track record yet difficult to build for other startup
founders can be viewed more favorably by incumbents.
Prior research has argued and shown that firms in industries such as biotechnology
can enhance their performance and innovative output by affiliating with “star scientists”
(e.g., Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). Stars are highly
exceptional innovators who are valuable for their ability to generate cutting-edge ideas and
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technologies that are less uncertain (e.g., Stuart, Ozdemir and Ding, 2007), and enable
startups accelerate the commercialization process (e.g., Agrawal, 2006). Moreover,
ventures that are associated with scientific stars are likely to be perceived as better quality
by investors in public capital markets (e.g., Higgins et al., 2011; Fuller and Rothaermel,
2011). Scientific stars therefore serve as credible signals for difficult to observe technical
attributes of early stage high-tech startups in various market settings. Inasmuch as
uncertainty and asymmetric information about startups’ technical quality impede
cooperative commercialization opportunities in the market for ideas and technologies,
affiliations with scientific stars will mitigate the risk of adverse selection and enable
startups to obtain form cooperative agreements. I thus posit:
Hypothesis 2.1 An early stage high-tech startup firm founded by a scientific star is more
likely to establish a cooperative commercialization agreement, compared
to startups whose founders are not scientific stars.
2.2.2

Former Employees of Prominent Firms
While the foregoing hypothesis suggests how distinguished scientific credentials of

founders can shape collaborative opportunities for early stage startups, my broad interest
lies in understanding the distinct types of founders’ credentials that play an instrumental
role in obtaining cooperative commercialization agreements for early stage startups. In this
regard, I note that while scientific accomplishments of founders signal the underlying
technical quality of the startup’s ideas and innovations, there are other types of credentials
that enable potential exchange partners to draw inferences about the prospects of an early
stage startup’s latent technologies. In particular, potential partners can also draw such
inferences by observing the employment credentials of their founders. Employment
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credentials of startup founders serve as signals of their unobservable human capital and
innovative capacities, but nonetheless costly for other startup founders to develop and
indicate. Thus, I argue below that startups founded by individuals who previously worked
with prominent firms are more likely to be considered as valuable startup collaborators in
the market for ideas and technologies.
In high-technology industries, it is well acknowledged that individuals’ career
experience shapes firm founding activities (e.g., Shane and Khurana, 2003). Employees of
incumbent firms leave their employers to found startups, often in the same industry (e.g.,
Klepper, 2001). Previous employment affiliations benefit startup founders in assimilating
technical know-how as well as development and market know-how, which are essential
capabilities for achieving greater success (e.g., Agarwal, et al., 2004; Buenstorf and
Klepper, 2009). In particular, prior employment with prominent firms provides individuals
opportunities for gaining deeper knowledge about their industry and information about
entrepreneurial opportunities, and specifically such opportunities will be widely available
for employees of prominent firms (e.g., Audia and Rider, 2005). Prominent firms have
greater incentives and resources to invest in research and development activities which
provide access to new information and knowledge about pioneering technologies (e.g.,
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Burton et al., 2002). In this regard,
individuals who are employed with prominent firms in the industry are more likely to
possess knowledge and information that is technically and commercially valuable,
enabling them an entrepreneurial advantage when they found their startup later in their
career (e.g., Venkataraman, 1997; Burton et al., 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004). For example,
at least a quarter of the biotechnology firms that went public during 1976-1996 were
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founded by former employees of Baxter, a prominent life sciences firm in the United States
(Higgins, 2005), suggesting that prior affiliation with Baxter helped these individuals
discover entrepreneurial opportunities within the biotechnology industry and develop their
ideas independently by founding their own startups. More importantly, because prior
positions at prominent firms are likely to have an effect on startup founders’ innovations
and strategies (e.g., Boeker, 1988), individuals who previously worked as research
engineers and scientists, chief technology officers at prominent firms are at a greater
chance of gaining exposure to emerging ideas and technologies that are also commercially
feasible (e.g., Gompers et al., 2005). Furthermore, previous research suggests and showed
that such highly skilled individuals who were affiliated with prominent firms in their past
are also more likely to perform better (Chatterji, 2009) and get noticed in the market (e.g.,
Burton et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2005).
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that previous employment affiliations
of startup founders act as signals about their accumulated skills and know-how prior to
founding their own startups. Inasmuch as information about founders’ technical know-how
and the quality of their innovations is costly to convey during early stages of a startup, and
prospective buyers of ideas find it difficult to discern aspects of startup’s latent
technologies and founders’ human capital, the prior employment affiliations of its founders
with prominent firms in the industry credibly conveys information related to the
unobservable details of the startup and its founders. Indeed, in their early stages, startups
founded by individuals who had prior employment affiliations with prominent firms are
likely to be viewed as more promising and favorable suppliers of new ideas and innovations
by prospective collaborators. In the same manner as how an entrepreneurial venture’s
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affiliation with prominent venture capitalists and underwriters provides credibility and
reduces uncertainty for external resource providers (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Hsu, 2006;
Ozmel et al., 2013), founders’ prior employment affiliation with prominent firms works as
a credential that enables early stage startups to engage in cooperative commercialization
agreements. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2.2 An early stage high-tech startup firm founded by a former employee of a
prominent

firm

is

more

likely

to

establish

a

cooperative

commercialization agreement, compared to startups whose founders lack
such affiliations.
2.2.3

Successful Founders
In the preceding hypotheses, I discussed how founders’ scientific credentials

(Hypothesis 1) and their employment credentials (Hypothesis 2) positively affect the
likelihood of cooperative commercialization agreements. Whereas the informational
content of these two distinct credentials of a high-tech startup’s founders allows potential
partners to credibly distinguish the technical value of the underlying ideas and innovations
of the startup, they might be less informative about the commercial prospects of the
startup’s difficult-to-observe ideas and technologies. Prospective partners would also
consider signals that enable them to discern the market potential of the startup’s ideas and
technologies, and in the absence of such information, it might be more difficult for the
startup to engage in cooperative commercialization agreements. In this regard, a high-tech
startup that is founded by an entrepreneur who was previously successful in taking a
venture through to an initial public offering (IPO) market is more likely to be valued as
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commercially viable by incumbent collaborators, and to the startup is more likely to attract
collaborative agreements.
Founders of startup firms vary based on their entrepreneurial experience and their
prior track records of achieving entrepreneurial success. Studies in entrepreneurship
suggest that founders with prior entrepreneurial experience are likely to have developed
skills and competencies that enable them success in their subsequent ventures (Stuart and
Abetti, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997; Chandler and Hanks, 1998; Westhead and Wright, 1998;
Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Delmar and Shane, 2006; Eesley and Roberts, 2012). Founders
with prior entrepreneurial experience are likely to have developed the ability to sense
opportunities (e.g., Teece, 2007) and produce innovations through trial and error (e.g.,
BrÜderl et al., 1992; Callander, 2011). In particular, serial entrepreneurs are more likely to
benefit from trial and error search (e.g., Bhide, 2000; Baum and Bird, 2009) and are
therefore seen as capable at productive commercialization of their ideas and technologies
(e.g., Hsu, 2007).
The above arguments suggest that prior entrepreneurial experience of founders can
contribute to better growth prospects for startups. However, during transactions that
provide access to external resources startups which are founded by serial entrepreneurs can
be regarded as more assuring insofar as the serial founders’ attributes are observable.
Schumpeter (1934) suggests that an entrepreneur is an innovator who is adept at
discovering new production techniques and ideas as well as developing them into
commercializable products and services. Thus, serial entrepreneurs with demonstrably
positive track records, yet difficult to attain by other startup founders, are more likely to
have superior innovative skills and abilities to produce ideas that are both technically and
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commercially valuable. I therefore expect that startups that are founded by serial
entrepreneurs who were able to raise capital in the public markets for their previous
ventures are more likely to realize collaborative opportunities with exchange partners.
Serial founders who had previously taken their firms through the IPO stage gain
prominence in the industry as successful entrepreneurs (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; Gompers
et al., 2006). Additionally, serial founders’ success in attracting investors in the public
capital markets indicates that they are skillful innovators (e.g., Gompers et al., 2006). More
specifically, in high-tech industries technical and commercial uncertainties critically
constrain startups ability to attract investors at the IPO stage (e.g., Berk et al., 2004; Sanders
and Boivie, 2004), so founders who were previously successful in promoting their startups
from founding stages to obtaining funds in public equity markets gain recognition as
prominent innovators of ideas and technologies. Furthermore, founders’ success in the IPO
market serves as a signal of their innovative quality (e.g., Gompers et al., 2006), and
therefore their subsequent startups are more likely to be viewed as possessing good quality
innovations and be sought after in the market for ideas and technologies. I therefore posit
that successful founders, or those who have earned the credential of taking public firms in
the past, will help secure cooperative commercialization opportunities to the startup:
Hypothesis 2.3 An early stage startup firm founded by a successful founder is more likely
to establish a cooperative commercialization agreement, compared to
startups whose founders lack such success.
2.2.4

Contingent Effects of Patent Publication
The foregoing hypotheses emphasize three distinct types of founders’ credentials

that can reduce the risk of adverse selection for buyers of latent technologies and ideas by
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signaling the underlying worth of the early stage startups’ embryonic technologies. I would
also suggest that the extent to which founders’ credentials can be valuable for early stage
startups in credibly conveying information about startups’ unobservable attributes will
hinge upon the information environment of potential transactions. These signals will be
most valuable when the risk of adverse selection is greater, whereas they are expected to
matter less as information is produced on the firm, the startup develops a track record, and
uncertainty subsidies on its technological resources and prospects. Given the importance
of patenting in high-tech industries and in shaping the information environment of potential
cooperative commercialization agreements, I argue that publication of filed patent
applications can play a significant role in reducing the risk of adverse selection and
facilitative collaborative exchanges.
Firms file patents for their ideas and innovations even as they are in early stages of
development (Kitch, 1977). Patents owned by a firm embody information about its research
activities and technical knowledge (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg, 2005). In particular, patents are important as signals for early stage startups
that are innovative, enabling them to separate from the less innovative startups (e.g., Long,
2002). Patent filing is also a costly process for startups that entails attorney fees, procedural
expenses (e.g., Graham and Sichelman, 2008; Levitas and MacFayden, 2009), and patents
can serve as credible signals that help startups transmit private information about their
innovativeness, R&D capabilities and knowledge stocks (e.g., Horstmann et al., 1985;
Aboody and Lev, 2000; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
For early stage high-tech startups, patents therefore lower the costs of obtaining
finance, necessary complementary resources, and access to product markets (e.g., Kitch,
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1977, Lemley, 2000). While obtaining a patent grant enables startup development (e.g.,
Mann and Sager, 2007), interestingly even in the absence of a patent grant startups can also
be successful at gaining access to resources necessary for growth. In particular, while
patent examination process can take as long as four years before a patent is granted (e.g.,
Popp et al., 2004), early stage startups can also enter into collaborative licensing
agreements with partners even in the absence of granted patents (Gans et al., 2008). In the
market for ideas and technologies, potential collaborative partners desire access to
information to learn about the efficacy of startups’ innovations and perform due-diligence
during selection (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Merges, 1999).
In this regard, published patent applications of startups can be effective at
broadcasting credible information about their early stage activities and attracting venture
financing by reducing uncertainty about their prospects (e.g., Haussler et al., 2009; Hsu
and Ziedonis, 2013). Recent research suggests that startups may be able to enter into
cooperative licensing agreements during the pre-patent grant period if their patent
application is published (Hegde and Luo, 2013). Publication of startups’ patent application
prior to its allowance reduces information asymmetries between early stage startups and
potential partners and facilitates credible disclosure of information about their
technological activities to potential exchange partners. Indeed, patent publication lowers
the costs for early stage startups and incumbents of contracting with each other in the
market for ideas by lowering information asymmetries, and patent publication allows a
credible mechanism for incumbents to perform due-diligence and learn about the potential
value of the startups hidden quality (e.g., Long, 2002).

30

The above ideas suggest that patent publication can be useful in producing
information and signals on a startup’s technological quality, so I expect it to be an important
contingency that shapes the effects of the three founders credentials covered in the previous
hypotheses. Prior to a patent publication, information asymmetry on an early-stage
technology venture will be substantial, suggesting that the credentialing mechanisms I have
theorized upon will be especially valuable in overcoming market frictions for cooperative
commercialization opportunities. To the extent that these problems ease and more
information becomes available on the startups’ technologies with the patent public, the
effects of founder credentials are expected to be less pronounced. Thus, I posit:
Hypothesis 2.4 The positive effect of a scientific star founder on the likelihood of a
cooperative commercialization agreement will be greater for early stage
startups that lack a patent publication.

Hypothesis 2.5 The positive effect of a founder’s previous employment affiliation with a
prominent firm on the likelihood of a cooperative commercialization
agreement will be greater for early stage startups that lack a patent
publication.

Hypothesis 2.6 The positive effect of a successful founder on the likelihood of a cooperative
commercialization agreement will be greater for early stage startups that
lack a patent publication.
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2.3

Methods

2.3.1

Data and Sample
To test these hypotheses, I use a dataset of licensing and R&D alliances in the

biopharmaceutical industry. This industry is a fitting empirical context for my analysis for
several reasons. First, the industry is driven by scientific discoveries and laboratory
experiments, and is representative of the features of market for ideas and technologies (e.g.,
Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002; Arora and Gambardella, 2010) where startup innovators trade
their technologies and ideas by entering into technology licensing and collaborative R&D
agreements. Second, technology startups in this industry rely upon alliances to
commercialize their innovations and obtain necessary resources to develop their
technologies (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Powell, Koput, and Doerr-Smith, 1996; Roijakkers and
Hagedoorn, 2006). Third, startups taking part in these alliances often have short track
records and difficult-to-evaluate technological resources and capabilities (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Nicholson, Danzon, and Mccullough, 2005; Levitas and McFayden, 2009). Finally,
these startups and their collaborative agreements are well documented in this industry,
providing rich information for empirical study.
To investigate the likelihood of cooperative commercialization agreements, my
research design should incorporate alliances that could have formed but did not for every
alliance that was realized. Startups in industries such as biopharmaceuticals and
telecommunications are characterized by uncertainty and information asymmetries (e.g.,
Gompers and Lerner, 2001), and they depend heavily on venture capitalists to finance their
early stage activities. I obtained the list of all VC-backed startups in the biopharmaceutical
industry from Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert database. Venture capitalists focus their
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investments in information technology and biotechnology industries (e.g., Hsu, 2006) and
play a significant role in providing private financing to startups in these sectors (e.g.,
Sahlman, 1990). I assembled data on startup licensing agreements and collaborations in
the biopharmaceutical industry between 1990-2012 from Thomson Reuters’ Recap, which
is considered robust and representative in its coverage of alliance agreements in this
industry (Schilling, 2009). Data from Recap has been used extensively by researchers in
management, economics, and finance to investigate startup activities such as cooperative
strategies in the biopharmaceuticals industry (e.g., Robinson and Stuart, 2007). In their
data, Recap denotes the party that provides the intellectual property, technology, and R&D
services, as the seller, and the counterparty that obtains the license as the client firm.
Biopharmaceutical startups chiefly vary in terms of adopted technology platforms
and therapeutic focus areas (FierceBiotech, 2013; Merck, 2013), which limit their
cooperative activities with client firms to these focus areas. So, while constructing the set
of unrealized alliances, I selected unrealized alliances that are comparable and similar to
realized alliances in many ways. In particular, I identified startups for each actual alliance
by performing a match between the therapeutic area of the focal alliance as well as the
therapeutic focus areas of all startups that were VC backed and founded prior to the date
of actual alliance. In this manner, I constructed the list of unrealized alliances from the
universe of startups that potentially could have been considered for alliance by the client
firm when it formed a deal with the focal startup firm.
I identified founders for all the startups obtained from VentureXpert. I relied on
various sources to collect information about founders. Specifically, I used BioScan,
VentureXpert, Bloomberg Businessweek, and company websites to collect names of
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founders. In addition, I also used sources such as SEC filings, LexisNexis, and other web
searches to obtain the names of all possible unique founders for each firm in my sample.
In my data of firm founders, I have 1962 unique firms after correcting for name changes
and 2984 unique founders. I tracked the career histories of all the 2984 founders in the
sample using LinkedIn, company websites, university web pages, and other sources such
as Bloomberg Investing to construct founder level explanatory and control variables.
Furthermore, I used Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science to collect information on scientific
publications of founders in the data used for this study.
To construct the final sample for analysis, I combined the sets of actual and
unrealized alliances of startups, and because I am interested in the role of founders when
the startup firm lacked a technological track record, I identified alliances that were formed
before the startup firm’s first patent was granted. Historically, patent applications that are
filed in the United States are publicly disclosed through a publication only when the patents
are granted, limiting visibility and disclosure of ideas in the public domain. The United
States federal law enacted the American Inventor Protection Act (AIPA) on November 29,
1999, which mandated the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to publish
patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000 18 months after their filing date.
Recent work sheds light on the role of a firm’s published patent application on the
likelihood of licensing (Luo and Hegde, 2013), noting that publication of a patent
application reveals information about the underlying technology and enhances the visibility
of the licensor firm in the market for ideas and technologies. Based on this understanding
about the role of a published patent application, I accounted for the AIPA act and identified
alliances of startups that were formed before and after their first patent application was
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published by combining the alliance data of VC-backed startups with patent information
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) after tracking company histories and name changes.
In order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity from cross-border transactions and
maintain consistency with the patent information from USPTO and NBER, I limited my
analyses to firms founded in the United States. Additionally, I considered only those
alliances that were formed after the first found of VC funding, and excluded alliances
where the startups received their last round of VC funding at least seven years before the
time of alliance, in order to exclude firms that are defunct, or “living dead” (e.g., Ruhnka,
Feldman, and Dean, 1992; Mason and Harrison, 2002). From the initial sample of 1962
VC backed firms I deleted diagnostics-based firms, bioinformatics firms, and firms that
focus on agricultural research. After applying these sampling screens and accounting for
extreme observations, I obtained a final sample of 51,881 actual and unrealized alliance
deals of 1480 distinct startups.
2.3.2

Measures and Analysis

Dependent variable
I investigate the likelihood that a startup firm is able to form a cooperative
commercialization agreement with a client firm. Accordingly, the dependent variable is
Cooperative Agreementijt, which takes a value of 1 for all actual alliances formed between
firm i and j in year t, and 0 for all unrealized alliances. I specified logistic regressions for
models of the determinants of cooperative commercialization agreements, because the
dependent variable in this study is dichotomous. Estimation of startup alliance formation
using probit regression models as well as rare events logistic regression models yielded
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results that offer same interpretations as those presented below. Because there are several
counterfactuals for each actual alliance, I also randomly identified unrealized alliances for
every actual alliance (i.e., one, three, five, or ten), and found similar interpretations as those
reported above. Finally, I also used robust standard errors clustered by client firm in my
analyses to accommodate the possibility that the observations are not independent.
Independent variables
In this study, the first hypothesis posited that the likelihood of a cooperative
commercialization agreement by a startup is positively related to the Scientific Stars in the
startup’s founding team. Prior research has operationalized this variable in different ways.
Zucker and Darby (1996) identified scientific stars on the basis of number of scientific
articles published until 1990 that reported the discovery of at least one among the 40
genetic sequences which were described in GenBank (1990). Zucker and Darby (2006)
used data of citation counts and publications of scientific articles provided by
ISIHighlycited.com and ISI Web of Science to identify top researchers in science and
engineering. Rothaermel and Hess (2007) constructed their measure of star scientists by
compiling publication and citation information for all scientists working at various
pharmaceutical firms in their sample, and identified stars as those who had received
citations at least two standard deviations above the mean. Higgins, Stephan, and Thursby
(2011) defined star scientists as university-affiliated researchers who are scientifically
accomplished by identifying university scientists who won a Nobel Prize.
Considering these differences in defining star scientists based upon the focus and
time frame of previous studies, I followed Rothaermel and Hess’ (2007) approach since it
is operationalizable across the long sequence of startup and alliance activity in my dataset.
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Accordingly, I searched for publication and citation data of all 2984 founders in my sample
of firm founders in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science database (formerly ISI Web of
Knowledge) and identified publications for each founder by mapping their name, scientific
field of study, and list of affiliated organizations. By matching in this manner, I extracted
publication and citation information for 1117 founders during the period 1990-2012 who
published scientific articles in fields related to biotechnology, pharmaceutical sciences, and
medical sciences. The average number of citations that founders received for their scientific
publications are 9578. I operationalized Scientific Stars as number of founders of a startup
firm who had been cited more than two standard deviations above the mean of the natural
logarithm of the number of citations during the 20-year span in my sample. There are 89
star scientists in my entire sample of founders, and are all affiliated to a research university
and retained their affiliation with the startup either as members on the scientific board or
as chief technology officers. I also performed robustness checks by constructing this
measure using different cutoff values (e.g., one standard deviation above the mean and
different percentiles (90th and 95th) and found the results to be robust.
Hypothesis 2 posited that employment of the startup founder at prominent
biopharmaceutical firms prior to founding the focal startup firm positively affects the
likelihood of cooperative agreements. I measured Former Employees of Prominent Firm
as the number of founders with previous R&D work experience at prominent firms and had
no entrepreneurial experience in the biopharmaceuticals industry prior to founding the
focal startup firm in the alliance deal. I explored the possibility that firms entered into
alliances with the founders’ previous prominent employers, but such cases only amounted
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to less than two percent of the total number of actual alliances, and results are robust to the
inclusion or exclusion of these transactions.
The third hypothesis posited that a successful startup founder will positively shape
the likelihood of startup cooperative commercialization for the startup. Accordingly, I
measured Successful Founders as the number of founders who had biopharmaceutical
industry experience, had not worked at prominent firms in the industry, and took public at
least one of their previously founded firm in the biopharmaceutical industry.
In this study, the fourth independent variable is Patent Publication. I suggested in
hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 that the positive effect of founders’ credentials on likelihood of
alliance formation is expected to be more pronounced for startups that lack technological
credentials of their own. In this paper, I am particularly interested in the contingent effects
of founders’ credentials before or after a patent publication. Patent Publication equals 1 if
the startup had its first patent application published prior to the focal alliance, and 0
otherwise. To identify startups that had their patent application published, I followed
Hegde and Luo (2013) and accounted for the American Inventor Protection Act of
November 29, 1999 (AIPA). Accordingly, for all actual and unrealized alliances of startups
that had formed after the law went into effect one year later (i.e., November 29, 2000), I
ascertained whether each startup firm participated in an alliance during the time period
between the publication of its first patent application, 18 months after its filing date, and
the patent grant date.
Control variables
In my analyses, I controlled for the effects of several variables at the founding team
level, startup firm level, client firm level, and dyadic level that could be correlated to the
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above covariates as well as the likelihood of alliance formation. To begin with, I controlled
for the number of founders in the startup’s founding team with entrepreneurial experience.
I measured Serial Entrepreneurs as the number of serial founders with no track record of
taking their previous ventures to the IPO stage. Founding teams that are scientifically
prolific are likely to be considered of good quality by licensees and alliance partners, and
therefore I controlled for founders’ number of scientific publications before the date of
alliance formation. Specifically, I measured Founders’ Publications as the natural
logarithm of the scientific publications of the most published founder among the startup
firm’s founding team at the time of the alliance. The average number of founders’
publications in my sample is 62, and the maximum number of publications is 1323. All
results are robust to alternative measurement of founders’ publications in terms of total and
average values of publications of the founding team at the time of alliance.
The biopharmaceutical startups in my sample are venture-backed, so I collected a
vector of controls capturing the characteristics of the venture capitalist firm (VC firm)
backing the startup firm and the venture funding received by the startup firm at the time of
the potential alliance. Startups that obtained the backing of prominent VC firms would be
able to distinguish themselves as having better prospects and obtain benefits in various
market contexts (Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al.,
2013). To control for the effects of prominent VC affiliations on alliance formation, I first
calculated the prominence of VC firms as the Bonacich centrality measure (Bonacich,
1987; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Next, I measured Prominent VC Backing of the startups
at the time of the alliance as a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the Bonacich
VC centrality measure of the most central VC backing the startup firm at the time of the
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alliance is greater than the median of VC centrality in the entire sample, and 0 otherwise
(Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). In supplemental analysis, I also measured VC prominence as
the centrality measure of the most prominence VC firm backing the startup firm as well as
the average centrality measure of VC firms backing the startup firm, and the results below
are robust to these alternative measurements of the variable. Previous research suggests
that the stage of VC funding and the amount of VC funding received by a startup firm are
indicative of a startup firm’s progress, maturity, and quality (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Lerner,
1995; Lerner and Gompers, 1998). Accordingly, I measured Amount of VC Funding as the
natural logarithm of the total dollar amount of VC funding received by the startup firm
prior to the time of alliance. Early Stage of VC Investment is defined as a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the startup firm is in early stage of VC funding (i.e., seed stage
or early stage), and zero otherwise. Startup Firm Age is a natural logged value of the age
of the startup firm at the time of alliance.
I also controlled for alliance activity of the startup firm, because the number of
alliances that the startup firm was able to form even while it did not obtain a patent is
indicative that the startup firm was subject to evaluations of quality by previous alliance
partners (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000) that enhances their credibility in the market
for ideas. In addition, it also conveys information about its visibility and outside options in
these markets, as well as its ability to be effective at engaging in licensing and collaborative
activities with alliance partners (e.g., Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Hagedoorn et al.,
2011). I measured Startup Alliance Experience as the number of alliances formed by the
startup firm at the time of alliance to control for the startup firm’s alliance activity and
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network (e.g., Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). The average startup firm formed
approximately two alliances prior to the focal alliance.
Similarly, I measured for the client firm’s alliance formation activity as the natural
logarithm of number of alliances formed by the client firm at the time of the alliance (i.e.,
Client Alliance Experience); the average client firm formed roughly 14 alliances prior to
the focal alliance. I also controlled for the technological capabilities of the client firm by
measuring Client Absorptive Capacity as the natural logarithm of the number of issued
patents at the time of alliance, the average client firm obtained 1108 patents at the time of
alliance.
Client firms may find it difficult to locate as well as evaluate a startup firm that is
not geographically proximate. I controlled for dyadic effects of geographic proximity on
likelihood of alliance formation by measuring Geographic Distance as the natural
logarithm of the great circle distance between the headquarters of the client firm and the
startup firm. In addition, I also controlled for whether the startup firm and client firm are
not located in a common biotechnology cluster by measuring Not Collocated as a dummy
variable that equals 1 if they are not collocated and 0 otherwise (e.g., Narula and
Santangelo, 2009). I also controlled for the age of the startup firm since startups may be
technologically attractive to prospective partners but also can present greater uncertainty
given a shorter track record (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Nicholson et al., 2005; Hsu, 2006).
Finally, I controlled for fixed effects of the year (Year Fixed Effects) in which the alliance
between the startup firm and client firm was formed.
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2.4 Results
I have suggested that startups that are composed of founders who are scientific
stars, former employees of prominent biopharmaceutical firms, and successful in taking
firms public are more likely to obtain collaborative agreements. Summary statistics of key
theoretical variables provides some key differences between the sets of actual and
unrealized alliances. In my sample, the number of actual alliances that are formed between
startups and client firms is 870, while the number of unrealized alliances is 51011. There
are 106 successful founders in my sample, and the average value of successful founders in
the set of actual alliances is 50 percent more than the value for unrealized alliances (0.15
and 0.10 respectively, p<0.001). The number of founders who have a PhD degree and
previously worked for a prominent biopharmaceutical firm is 263. The average value of
founders who were affiliated with prominent biopharmaceutical firms prior to founding the
startup firm is 47 percent more than the value for unrealized alliances (0.31 and 0.21
respectively, p<0.001). Similarly, there are 73 scientific stars in my sample, and the
average value of scientific stars in the set of actual alliances is 88 percent more than the
value for unrealized alliances (0.17 and 0.09 respectively, p<0.001).
Correlations in Table 2.1 suggest that startups that received more funding from
venture capitalist firms and are a later stage of VC investment are more likely to obtain an
alliance with client firms (p<0.001 and p<0.001, respectively). Startups that are not
collocated with client firms and are farther away from them are less likely to form alliances
together (p<0.001 and p<0.001, respectively). The maximum value of the variance
inflation factors is 1.36, less than the rule of thumb value of 10 used for assessing
multicollinearity problems (Neter et al., 1989). The maximum condition number is 7.61,
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which is below the threshold value of 30, indicating that there are no severe
multicollinearity concerns (Belsley et al., 1980).
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of logistic regression models for the likelihood of
startup alliance formation. Model 1 is a baseline specification model consisting of control
variables. Specifically, Model 1 shows the direct effects of patent publication, serial
entrepreneurs and founders’ publications on likelihood of startup alliance formation
(p<0.05, p<0.05, and p<0.05, respectively). Model 2 builds on Model 1 and shows the
direct effects of all hypothesized founders’ credentials. Overall, both models are significant
(p<0.001), and inclusion of all hypothesized variables increases the explanatory power of
the model (p<0.001).
In Hypothesis 1, I predict that the likelihood of a cooperative agreement will be
higher for startups that are founded by scientific stars. The coefficient estimate of star
scientists is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). I estimated the economic
significance of a star scientist on a firm’s ability to earn an alliance. With all the other
covariates at their means, a startup firm that has at least one scientific star in its founding
team is 36 percent more likely to achieve an alliance with client firm, supporting H1. The
second hypothesis in this study predicts that startups that have founders who had previously
worked at prominent biopharmaceutical firms are more likely to secure an alliance with a
client firm. The coefficient estimate of this variable is positive and significant (p<0.01)
and is also economically meaningful. Specifically, a startup firm that has at least one
founder who had worked at a prominent firm is 24 percent more likely to establish an
alliance, with all other covariates at their mean values.
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Table 2.2. Logistic Regression Estimation Resultsa
Variables
Constant

1
-0.731
(0.783)
231.48***
-0.447***
(0.045)
-0.341***
(0.027)
-2.479***
(0.211)
-0.006
(0.019)
0.109*
(0.050)
0.064***
(0.003)
-0.270**
(0.096)
0.322***
(0.035)
0.133
(0.084)
0.044*
(0.019)
0.186*
(0.078)
0.278*
(0.140)

2

-0.554
(0.783)
Year Fixed Effectsb
222.01***
Startup Firm Age
-0.426***
(0.045)
Geographic Distance
-0.338***
(0.028)
Not Colocated
-2.458***
(0.213)
Client Absorptive Capacity
-0.005
(0.019)
Client Alliance Experience
0.108*
(0.050)
Startup Alliance Experience
0.064***
(0.003)
Early Stage of VC Investment
-0.331***
(0.098)
Amount of VC Funding
0.289***
(0.036)
VC Prominence
0.161†
(0.085)
Founders’ Publications
0.011
(0.021)
Serial Entrepreneurs
0.312***
(0.081)
Patent Publication
0.293*
(0.141)
Scientific Stars
0.312**
(0.103)
Former Employees of Prominent Firm
0.213**
(0.067)
Successful Founders
0.330**
(0.101)
Log likelihood
-3817.91
-3803.97
Wald χ2
994.15***
1034.27***
a
***
**
*
†
N = 51,881.
p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses .bχ2 values of joint significance for fixed effects.

45

Table 2.3. Interaction Effects between Founders’ Credentials and Patent
Publicationa
Variables
Constant
Year Fixed Effectsb
Startup Firm Age
Geographic Distance
Not Colocated
Client Absorptive Capacity
Client Alliance Experience
Startup Alliance Expeirence
Early Stage of VC Investment
Amount of VC Funding
VC Prominence
Founders’ Publications
Serial Entrepreneurs
Patent Publication
Scientific Stars
Former Employees of Prominent
Firm
Successful Founders
Scientific Stars*Patent Publication
Former Employees of Prominent
Firm*Patent Publication
Successful Founders*Patent
Publication

1
-0.537
(0.781)
221.39***
-0.427***
(0.045)
-0.339***
(0.028)
-2.463***
(0.213)
-0.005
(0.019)
0.109*
(0.051)
0.064***
(0.003)
-0.341***
(0.099)
0.288***
(0.036)
0.169*
(0.085)
0.010
(0.021)
0.314***
(0.080)
0.291*
(0.142)
0.376***
(0.105)
0.215**
(0.068)
0.344***
(0.100)
-0.418*
(0.196)

2
-0.557
(0.783)
222.05***
-0.426***
(0.045)
-0.338***
(0.028)
-2.460***
(0.212)
-0.005
(0.019)
0.108*
(0.050)
0.064***
(0.003)
-0.330***
(0.098)
0.289***
(0.036)
0.163†
(0.086)
0.011
(0.021)
0.313***
(0.081)
0.292*
(0.141)
0.312**
(0.103)
0.207**
(0.069)
0.331**
(0.101)

3
-0.569
(0.781)
222.35***
-0.425***
(0.045)
-0.338***
(0.028)
-2.460***
(0.213)
-0.005
(0.019)
0.109*
(0.050)
0.064***
(0.003)
-0.329***
(0.098)
0.288***
(0.036)
0.164†
(0.085)
0.010
(0.021)
0.339***
(0.081)
0.291*
(0.142)
0.318**
(0.104)
0.209**
(0.068)
0.361***
(0.101)

4
-0.552
(0.780)
221.73***
-0.426***
(0.045)
-0.339***
(0.028)
-2.463***
(0.213)
-0.005
(0.019)
0.110*
(0.051)
0.064***
(0.003)
-0.339***
(0.099)
0.287***
(0.036)
0.170*
(0.086)
0.009
(0.021)
0.337***
(0.081)
0.290*
(0.143)
0.370***
(0.105)
0.212**
(0.069)
0.366***
(0.100)
-0.386*
(0.194)
-0.013
(0.131)

-0.325*
(0.149)

-0.251†
(0.143)

0.073
(0.128)

Log likelihood
-3799.72
-3803.83
-3801.53
-3798.27
Wald χ2
1040.33***
1033.25***
1044.86***
1052.38***
a
***
**
*
†
N = 51,881. p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1.Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.bχ2
values of joint significance for fixed effects.
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I also found support for Hypothesis 3, which predicts that successful founders on a startup
firm’s founding team have a positive impact on its likelihood of engaging in a cooperative
commercialization agreement. The coefficient estimate of successful founders is positive
and significant (p<0.01). Holding everything else constant, startups that have at least one
successful founder on their founding teams are 39 percent more likely to achieve an
alliance. Overall, the incremental effects of the three founders’ credentials are significant
and economically meaningful, and their effects on cooperative commercialization
agreements are comparable.
Table 2.3 reports interaction effects between patent publication and the
hypothesized founders’ credentials. Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 suggest that the above effects
of founding team characteristics on a startup firm’s ability to obtain an alliance will be
more pronounced for startups that have yet to publish their first patent application.
Specifically, Hypothesis 4 predicts that the positive effect of having a scientific star on the
founding team will be more pronounced for a startup firm that lacks publication of itsfirst
patent application. The coefficient estimate of the interaction variable is negative and
significant (p<0.05) and supports my prediction in H4. Hypothesis 5 suggests that the
positive effect of a founder who had prior employment at a prominent biopharmaceutical
firm will be more pronounced when the startup firm had not published its first patent
application. The coefficient estimate of the interaction variable is not significant and does
not support my prediction. Interpretation of marginal effects and graphical analysis also
did not support H5. In Hypothesis 6, I posited that the positive effect of a successful founder
will be stronger for a startup firm that did not obtain publication of its first patent
application. Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient estimate of the interaction
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variable is negative and significant (p<0.05). The marginal effects of the interactions are
also consistent with the above interpretations.

Figure 2.1. Interaction Effect between Scientific Stars and Patent Publication on the
Likelihood of Formation of Cooperative Agreement

In Figures 2.1 and 2.2, I provide graphical illustrations for interaction effects of star
scientists and successful founders with patent publication. Figure 2.1 shows the negative
interaction between star scientists and patent publication. A star scientist on a startup firm’s
founding team increases the chances of alliance formation for the startup firm by 45 percent
when it does not have a published patent application, but this effect no longer holds once a
patent is published. Furthermore, I infer from Figure 2.1 that the positive effect of a patent
publication is most prominent (nearly 30 percent) for startups that do not have star
scientists on their founding team.
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Figure 2.2. Interaction Effect between Successful Founders and Patent Publication on the
Likelihood of Formation of Cooperative Agreement

Figure 2.2 shows the negative interaction between successful founders and patent
publication. Startups that lack a patent publication are 40 percent more likely to obtain an
alliance in the market for ideas when they have a successful founder on their founding
team, and this effect is no longer evident once the firm has published a patent. This offers
support for the predictions about the role of startup firm founders’ entrepreneurial
credentials in effecting transactions in the market for ideas and technologies, especially
when the startup lacks a track record and technological credentials to offer to prospective
collaborators.
Results for some of the control variables are also notable. The coefficient estimate
for a startup firm’s patent publication is positive and significant (p<0.05). This result lends
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support for research that argued for the role of patents in reducing uncertainty and
information asymmetry between a seller and a potential buyer of technology and R&D
services in the market for ideas (e.g., Gans and Stern, 2003; Gans et al., 2008; Hegde and
Luo, 2013). I also note that a startup firm that is affiliated to a prominent venture capitalist
firm as well as received more funding from VCs is more likely to successful in forming an
alliance (p<0.1 and p<0.001, respectively), which is consistent with the argument that VC
affiliations enable young ventures to enhance their growth prospects during various stages
of development (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Hsu, 2006). Startups that are in their early stages
of VC investment are less preferred in the market for ideas (p<0.001), perhaps because
they are still in a nascent stage and uncertainty about their technologies will be naturally
higher. Finally, startups that gained visibility and credibility in the market for ideas through
previous alliance transactions are more likely to become successful in selling their
technologies as well as R&D services (p<0.001).
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1

Contributions and Implications
In this paper, I extend the fundamental ideas proposed in the economics of

information to the context of market for ideas and technologies and examine the
mechanisms through which startups can prevail over the adverse effects of informational
asymmetries and uncertainties which restrict their early stage growth opportunities. Early
stage startups typically try to obtain resources from external agents (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999;
Shane and Cable, 2002) and are devoid of track records (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002) that
enhance their visibility and establish credibility to resource providers. Potential investors
and collaborators face difficulties locating and selecting early startups lacking credible
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track records (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004). In this regard, the theoretical contribution
of this study is that founders’ credentials play an influential role in shaping early stage
commercialization opportunities for startups by signaling the value of startups’ latent ideas
and technologies. Specifically, I unpack three distinct credentials of startup founders that
are costly for others to attain and which enable transactions with firms by reducing their
costs of search and selection. Moreover, the findings indicate that these credentials of
founders matter more when the startup lacks a patent publication, which is a critical
accomplishment for startups in their early stages of development (e.g., Kitch, 1977; Long,
2002; Hegde and Luo, 2013).
In this study, I advance the concept of founder’s credentials and contribute in
several ways to research on cooperative commercialization strategies of new ventures in
strategy and entrepreneurship. For the strategy literature, I build upon the recent stream of
research on market for ideas and technologies (e.g., Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001;
Gans and Stern, 2003, 2010) and extend information economics by considering the ex-ante
formation of cooperative agreements between upstream suppliers of ideas and
complementary resource owners. Prior work (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001)
emphasizes licensing of intellectual property and division of innovative labor between
upstream suppliers of ideas and technologies and developers of ideas, but does not
adequately contribute to understanding about how these transactions between upstream and
incumbent parties come into existence. I thus complement the research on market for ideas
and technologies and collaborative R&D partnerships (e.g., Stuart, 1998; Gulati. 1999),
and broadly to research on alliances and partner selection (Li et al., 2008; Rothaermel and
Boeker, 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). In particular, I suggest that founders’
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credentials play an important role in enabling startups transact with incumbent partner
firms by reducing information asymmetries and risks of adverse selection for incumbent
firms, thus creating the division of innovative labor and cooperative commercialization
opportunities for startups. In future research it will be interesting to examine how founding
team credentials shape the choice, design, and structure of cooperative commercialization
agreements with incumbent firms (e.g., Gulati 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Lerner and
Merges, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Li et al., 2008)
I also contribute to research invoking signaling theory to examine the different
types of signals that enable performance for new ventures in various market contexts. This
stream of research has shown that ties to prominent organizations such as venture
capitalists reduces adverse selection risk by signaling quality and thereby helps startups
gain access to various resources required for their growth and survival (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006, Ozmel et al., 2013). My study complements
this stream of work by demonstrating the instrumental role that founders’ credentials play
in signaling the underlying nature and quality of early stage startups’ ideas and
technologies and accomplishing relations with incumbent partners. Given that firms can
signal their prospects in several different ways (e.g., Riley, 2001; Long, 2002; Certo, 2003;
Hsu, 2006; Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Connelly et al., 2011), for future research it will
be interesting to examine the relationship between these other signals and founders’
credentials in shaping collaborative outcomes for startups.
My study also informs research on founding team in enhancing performance and
growth prospects of entrepreneurial firms. This stream of research examined the effects of
founders’ human capital and networks on performance of entrepreneurial ventures
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(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997; Baum et al., 2000; Colombo and
Grili, 2005; Delmar and Shane, 2006; Eesley and Roberts, 2012) and alliance formation
(e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart et al., 2007; Hallen, 2008; Luo et al.,
2009). My study complements prior research by explicating three distinct credentials of
founders and showing that they reduce information asymmetries about an early stage
startup’s ideas and technologies and create cooperative strategies. In this regard, I suggest
that while human capital of individuals is not observable by outsiders (e.g, Mincer, 1958;
Coff, 1997), founders’ credentials positively correlate with unobservable human capital of
founders, and enable potential collaborators draw inferences about expected quality of
ideas and inventions of early stage startups.
Furthermore, I also extend previous research that discussed the effect of star
scientists on the performance of high-tech startups (e.g., Zucker et al., 2002; Rothaermel
and Hess, 2007; Higgins et al., 2011; Fuller and Rothaermel, 2011) by showing that
superior scientific track record of a founder in a significant manner effects collaborative
opportunities for early stage startups, particularly when they lack patent credentials. In
addition, the finding that superior employment credentials of founders shape collaborative
relations for early stage startups connects to the stream of research that examined how
founder’s prior employment affiliations enables performance for entrepreneurial firms
(e.g., Beckman, 2006, Beckman and Burton, 2008). Furthermore, my theory about the role
of founding team in enabling cooperative strategies for startups complements the research
on top management team (TMT) experience and prestige of performance of new ventures
(Kor, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Kroll et al., 2007; Certo et al., 2001; Certo, 2003).
Given that there is more than one type of founders’ credentials, it will be interesting to

53

examine how they interact with each other and shape innovative performance and
outcomes for startups in various market contexts.
Finally, I contribute to research on resource-based theory (RBT) (e.g., Penrose,
1959; Wernefelt, 1984) and resource based view (e.g, Barney 1991) and complement
emerging stream of research about the role of founders’ experience and human capital (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Chandler and Hanks,
1998). This study demonstrates that credentials of founders can also be instrumental as
“resources” for startups (Brush et al., 2001) during their founding stages , and provide
signaling services and compensate for the lack of a patent (e.g., Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
2.5.2

Limitations and Future Research Directions
In addition to the research opportunities discussed above, future research might also

address several limitation of this study. First, the empirical context in this study is
biotechnology sector, where patents offer strong appropriability for firms and where
cooperative commercialization activity between upstream suppliers and incumbent firms
is significant. It would therefore be interesting to examine what credentials of startup
founders are relevant in in other empirical contexts where appropriability regimes are
weak, or based on secrecy, such as movie industry, video game industry, and computer
software industry. Furthermore, it will be useful to examine whether effect of founders’
credentials on reducing informational asymmetries are contingent on other signaling
mechanisms such as certification, contracts and warranties.
Second, while I emphasized the role of founders’ credentials in this study, there
could be other factors that could be shaping collaborative agreements for startups. For
example, mobility of individuals who were previously employed at potential collaborators
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may also be playing a role in formation of deals with firms (e.g., Rosenkopf and Almeida,
2003), or by the founders’ social capital and industry-level networks (e.g., Rosenkopf et
al., 2001; Hallen, 2008). Therefore, in future research it will be worth investigating the
effects of founders’ networks and mobility of employees from other organizations in
shaping collaborative exchanges for startups, and their contingent effects on the founders’
credentials in reducing adverse effects of informational asymmetries.
Third, given that I focus on early stage biopharmaceutical startups that are VC
backed, my study is silent about firms that are not venture backed. Previous research
indicates that skillful entrepreneurs are widely visible and less likely to depend on
experienced VCs to attract commercialization opportunities (Gompers et al., 2006). So,
while paucity of data on startups that are not venture backed limited the scope of analysis
in this study, it will be useful in future work to examine how the effect of founders’
credentials on collaborative outcomes varies between startups that are venture backed
startups and startups that received other forms of funding such as angel funding (e.g., Kerr
et al., 2014). Also, because my study has focused on early stage startups that lack a patent
grant, in future work it will be valuable to investigate how the signaling benefits of
founders’ credentials in conveying information about the unobservable quality of the
startup’s knowledge varies with the startup’s patenting track record and its patenting
quality (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
2.6

Conclusion
This study extends the fundamental ideas of economics of information and unpacks

founders’ attributes and their contingent effects in the context of market for ideas and
technologies. Specifically, I suggest three distinct credentials of founders – scientific stars,
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former employees of prominent firms, and successful founders - which can be instrumental
in reducing the adverse effects of informational asymmetries and facilitating collaborative
commercialization agreements for startups. Yet, the positive impact of these distinct
credentials of founders will be more pronounced when startups are deficient of track
records such as a published patent application.
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CHAPTER 3. FOUNDERS’ CREDENTIALS AND RISK ALLOCATION IN
COOPERATIVE COMMERCIALIZATION AGREEMENTS OF STARTUPS
3.1

Introduction
Early stage high-tech startups generally lack financial and organizational resources

and track records (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002; Stinchcombe, 1965), and engage in
cooperative modes of commercialization allow startups to mitigate resource deficiencies
(e.g., Pisano, 1989; Ahuja, 2000; Lerner, Shane, and Tsai, 2003), access incumbents’
complementary organizational capabilities (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002; Shan, Walker, and
Kogut, 1994; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), and capture value from their promising ideas
and technologies (e.g., Teece, 1986). Further, incumbents also gain opportunities to learn
about new ideas and technologies developed externally and stay up-to-date with the latest
developments in an industry (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Broadly, cooperative
commercialization arrangements between startups and established incumbents occur as
licensing and R&D agreements, or strategic alliances, which involve a collaborative
process wherein the startups specialize in supplying new ideas, technologies, research
services, and know-how (e.g., Teece, 1988; Powell et al., 1996; Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella, 2002; Gans and Stern, 2003), and incumbents financially support and
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compensate startups for “selling” their ideas and knowledge services (e.g., Lerner and
Merges, 1998; Robinson & Stuart, 2007; Gans and Stern, 2010).
However, incumbents would be generally cautious about the technological
innovativeness of startups’ ideas as well as startups’ incentive to misrepresent the overall
prospects of their ideas (e.g., Arrow; 1962), and would be induced to reallocate risk by
providing financial resources contingent on technical or product market milestones (e.g.,
Gallini and Wright, 1990; Nicholson et al., 2005). In high-tech sectors such as
biotechnology, the hazards of misrepresentation and uncertainty about prospects of hightech startups’ ideas can be acute for incumbents given startups’ intangible resources and
their strategic need for collaborations even before obtaining a demonstrable track record
(e.g., Stuart, 1998; Gulati and Higgins, 2003). Unless these hazards are mitigated, startups
that possess intrinsically good quality ideas cannot persuade prospective collaborators to
provide financial payments and organizational resources for developing startups’ ideas and
projects. Prior research in strategy and entrepreneurship has suggested that early stage
startups can pursue actions that credibly signal the underlying quality of their resources,
thereby facilitating exchanges in various market contexts (e.g., Lee, 2001; Long, 2002;
Certo, 2003; Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Dewally and Ederington, 2006; Hsu, 2006; Ozmel
et al., 2013). While there are many likely signals a firm might utilize (Riley, 2001; Connelly
et al., 2011), most of these signals can take considerable time to develop and can even be
absent for early stages of startups.
Startups’ plans, ideas, and innovations are a direct result of their founders’
intangible skills and human capital (e.g., Klepper, 2001; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Indeed,
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when startups are in their earliest stages of development, incumbents can evaluate the
prospects of an early stage startup’s latent innovations based on the credentials and track
records of their founders (e.g., Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1990; Rao, 1994; Venkataraman,
1997). This suggests that even in the absence of other signals (e.g., a technological track
record through patenting, establishing networks, etc.), startup founders’ accomplishments
can act as signals and credibly reduce uncertainty for potential collaborators about the
quality of startups’ ideas (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002). When faced with uncertainty and
the risk of adverse selection about the technical and commercial prospects of early stage
startups’ ideas and projects, potential collaborators would be wary about committing
capital to the startup in the form of cash payments, and will favor shifting part of the
overpayment risk to the startup having better information on its resources and prospects
(e.g., Coff, 1999; Kohers & Ang, 2000; Datar et al., 2001). In this regard, I suggest that
relevant accomplishments of startups’ founders provide credible means for potential
collaborators to learn about the underlying technical and commercial prospects of early
stage startups’ ideas and enhance the informational efficiency of their transactions by
favorably altering collaborators’ beliefs about the quality of startups’ nascent ideas and
innovations.
In this paper I build upon ideas expounded in the economics of information about
the risk of adverse selection and its remedies (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973) in the
context of the market for ideas and know-how. More specifically, I develop hypotheses
about the remedial role of startup founders’ credentials in obtaining favorable payment
structures for startups during collaborative commercialization with incumbents. In
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particular, I propose two distinct credentials of startup founders and argue that they play
an instrumental role in positively shaping the proportion of upfront payments that startups
can obtain from their licensees, rather than deferred and contingent payments. More
importantly, I provide evidence for the intuitive notion that the two distinct founders’
credentials – star founders and successful founders – would complement each other.
Finally, because high-tech startups are usually venture backed (e.g., Sahlman, 1990;
Gompers and Lerner, 2001) and startups’ venture activity produces information on
startups’ progress, I also suggest that the positive effects of these two distinct founders’
credentials on the proportion of upfront payments that startups receive will vary within
startups’ venture activity. In particular, I suggest that the positive effect of founders’
technical credentials on upfront proportion will be prominent for a startup in early stages
of venture rounds, while the positive effect of founders’ entrepreneurial credentials in the
form of prior IPOs will be prominent during later stages of venture development.
At a broad level, I contribute to literature in strategy and entrepreneurship by
examining the signaling role of founders’ credentials in enhancing the value attained from
their ideas and innovative capabilities from cooperative commercialization arrangements.
Specifically, this study extends research on the market for ideas as well as interfirm
collaborations in several ways. First, I investigate an underexplored aspect of startup
performance – payment structures in cooperative agreements – and contribute to the
research on market for ideas and collaborative R&D partnerships by suggesting that
founders’ credentials play an important role in reducing risks of adverse selection for
prospective partners and shaping favorable compensation structures for startups. The
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theory in this study suggests how founders’ technical and entrepreneurial credentials are
distinctive, yet complement one another.
Second, I also advance research in strategy and entrepreneurship by showing the
importance of founder effects and the value of credentialing mechanisms in strategic
alliances. Prior research has examined the roles of inter-organizational relationships (e.g.,
Gulati, 1999, Ozmel et al., 2013), affiliations with prominent venture capitalists (e.g., Hsu,
2006), technological track records (e.g., Stuart, 1998; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), and
experience of top management team members (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996)
in facilitating collaborations for startups. I therefore complement this research by showing
how founders’ credentials shape payment structures and the allocation of risk in
partnerships involving startups. By doing so, this study contributes to an emerging stream
of work on the design of alliances which has so far emphasized contract complexity and
specific provisions geared to partners’ control and coordination concerns (e.g., Luo, 2002;
Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007; Mesquita & Brush, 2008; Hoetker
& Mellewigt, 2009; Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2010).
3.2

Theory and Hypotheses
In the market for ideas, early stage startups’ poor information structure and

incentive to misrepresent information contribute to the risk of adverse selection for
incumbent partners (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993), and they
will be unwilling to bear the risk of investing in the collaborative development of startups’
innovations into commercial products. At the margin incumbents desire to safeguard
against the ‘lemons’ problem (e.g., Akerlof, 1970) induced by uncertainty and asymmetric
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information about quality of startups’ innovations and respond by shifting the risks to
startups through contingent contracts (e.g., Arrow, 1971). Unless, of course, startups can
limit uncertainty and otherwise reduce the risk of adverse selection for the incumbent
buyers in the market for ideas, startups are liable to suffer suboptimal financing
arrangements for their projects and forgo growth opportunities (e.g., Hubbard, 1998).
In general, contingent-payment structures are quite popular in several market
contexts burdened with uncertainty and adverse selection risks (e.g., Robichek and Myer,
1966). For example, in the venture capital industry, venture capitalists evaluate startups’
promise based on their progress, and accordingly stage their investments in startups based
on certain pre-specified measurable milestones (e.g., Gompers, 1995). Similarly, in the
mergers and acquisitions context, acquirer firms use contingent earnouts as an instrument
to mitigate overvaluation risk and uncertainties in valuation of privately-held targets
lacking track records (e.g., Coff, 1999; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). In a similar manner,
cooperative commercialization arrangements in the market for ideas and know-how entail
a sequence of payments specified by incumbent firms to startups. These payments are
usually structured as upfront payments, milestone payments, and royalties on sales.
Especially, because uncertainty about quality will be high when startups lack track records
that can attest to their unobservable attributes, incumbents face significant risk of
overpaying for startups’ ideas. In contrast, as I will discuss, when startups that are
inherently ‘good’ can credibly signal the technical and commercial prospects of their
intangible ideas and know-how, incumbents are likely to adjust their beliefs and structure
a greater portion of the total negotiated value to startups as upfront payments.
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Spence (1973) originally proposed the role of education credentials of employees
as signaling mechanisms in ameliorating the risk of adverse selection for prospective
employers in the labor market. Many studies in management and economics literatures
elucidate various signaling mechanisms which can enable entrepreneurs and startup firms
to obtain necessary resources of growth in a wide range of market settings (e.g., Amit,
Glosten, and Muller, 1990; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart
et al., 1999; Certo, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Levitas and McFayden, 2009; Zhang and
Wiersema, 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). For instance, startup firms can engage in quality
certification to mitigate the risk of adverse selection by contracting with prominent venture
capitalists and prominent exchange partners even on heavily discounted terms (e.g., Hsu,
2004; Nicholson et al., 2005), to be able to strike future deals with incumbents (e.g., Hsu,
2006; Ozmel et al., 2013). Noting that startups’ ideas are a direct result of their founders’
unobservable abilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982), superior quality startups founded by
highly accomplished founders will be able to distinguish themselves from others, and
reduce their risk of incurring more of their innovations’ returns as contingent payments
rather than as upfront payments that increase profits and are resources available for
immediate investment.
The research hypotheses in this study propose two credentials of startup founders
that can effectively function as signaling devices, in the sense that they credibly update
buyers’ beliefs and are also costly to acquire and imitate for other startup founders (Spence,
1973). More importantly, I argue that these two distinct accomplishments of startup
founders credibly attest to two distinctive, albeit complementary attributes, of startups’
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ideas and know-how – their technical quality and commercial prospects. Finally, this study
also suggests that the positive effects of these two distinct founders’ accomplishments on
the proportion of upfront payments that startups receive will vary with the stages of
startups’ development.
3.2.1

Star Founders
Startup founders’ unobservable inventive and scientific competences have a direct

bearing on the technical promise of their startups’ ideas and know-how. When the
characteristics of ideas and technologies of startups are hard to evaluate, startups’ exchange
partners can alternatively draw genuine inferences about startups’ unobservable quality
from startup founders’ distinguishable scientific and technical track records. In a nutshell,
while the core of startups’ difficult-to-evaluate intangible ideas and knowledge assets are
certainly shaped by startup founders’ underlying skills and knowledge (e.g., Teece, 1981),
startups’ exchange partners can appraise the underlying epistemic worth of startups’ ideas
only through the observable distinctive technical and scientific accomplishments of
founders. While costly for other startup founders to imitate, outstanding technical and
scientific track records convey information about founders’ unobservable human capital
(Spence, 1973, 2002) and serve as credible signals for the quality of early stage startups’
ideas. Such track records can therefore enable licensees of startups’ ideas and know-how
to adjust their beliefs about the latent technical quality and authenticity of startups’ ideas.
Specifically, in knowledge-driven industries such as computer software and
biopharmaceuticals, creation of new knowledge and ideas is critically determined by the
scientific depth and technical know-how of individuals. In any field of activity not all
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individuals can be equally good at developing high-quality ideas, and on the whole
individuals equipped with deeper domain knowledge and demonstrated skills are more
likely to generate technically-robust ideas (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 2003).
Given the fact that individuals vary in their unobservable innovative abilities (e.g.,
Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985; Felin and Hesterly, 2007), the ability to create superior
quality know-how and ideas by experts cannot be easily acquired and replicated by other
types of individuals.
Previous research suggests that expert individuals who earned credentials as star
scientists (henceforth ‘star founders’) enable firms in knowledge-driven industries such as
biotechnology enhance their performance and innovative output (e.g., Zucker, Darby, and
Armstrong, 2002; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). Generally, in knowledge-driven industries,
star individuals are regarded highly for their exceptional ingenuity and are known for their
ability to generate cutting-edge ideas and technologies that are less uncertain (e.g., Zucker,
Darby and Armstrong, 1998). As a consequence, they enable startups to accelerate the
commercialization process (e.g., Agrawal, 2006; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998).
Moreover, firms associated with star individuals obtain superior performance in the public
equity markets as they are perceived as better quality firms by investors (e.g., Higgins et
al., 2011; Fuller and Rothaermel, 2011).
Spence (1973) suggests that in the labor markets employees with better educational
qualifications are viewed as possessing productivity enhancing skills and rewarded higher
wages by employers. In a similar way, in the market for ideas startup founders with star
credentials are more likely to be regarded as having outstanding human capital capable of
producing cutting-edge ideas and innovations (e.g., Burton, Sorenson, and Beckman,
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2002). Inasmuch as uncertainty about the technical prospects of startups’ ideas poses the
risk of adverse selection for incumbents, startups founded by individuals who acquired star
scientist credentials would be regarded as possessing ideas and projects that are technically
superior. So, I would expect startups founded by stars to obtain a higher fraction of the
total consideration as upfront payment from incumbent clients. By contrast, incumbents
would be prone to adverse selection when transacting with startups that lack star founders
and seek to transfer risk to them by offering lower upfront payments and providing
contingent payments. I thus posit:
Hypothesis 3.1 A star founder on a startup’s founding team will have a positive effect on
the proportion of upfront payments the startup receives in cooperative
commercialization agreements.
3.2.2

Successful Founders
While a star founder can credibly shape incumbents’ beliefs about the underlying

technical attributes of startup’s ideas and their technical prospects, incumbents may still
face considerable uncertainty about the commercial viability and market potential of
startups’ ideas. However, incumbents are likely to adjust their expectations about the
commercial prospects of startups’ ideas based on signals about the difficult-to-estimate
market potential of startups’ ideas. Specifically, startups founded by innovators who were
successful in taking a previous venture through to an initial public offering (IPO) are more
likely to be regarded as commercially promising and present a lower risk of adverse
selection. Founders largely shape the transformation of an idea or concept into
commercializable products and services (e.g., Feeser and Willard, 1990), and founders
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differ in terms of their entrepreneurial abilities. As Schultz (1980) suggests, past experience
endows founders with knowledge that is essential for production of entrepreneurial ideas.
In general, experience imparts individuals with deeper knowledge and sharpens their
abilities to grasp nuances about a given activity (e.g., Arrow, 1962).
Specifically, previous entrepreneurial experience can significantly enhance skills
and competencies which widen founders’ cognitive abilities and enable better performance
of their subsequent entrepreneurial efforts (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Stuart and
Abetti, 1990; Chandler and Hanks, 1998). The ability to recognize opportunities for
innovation and undertake associated risks will be heterogeneous among founders
(Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979; Teece, 2007), and likely to be superior for those with
previous entrepreneurial experience. Prior entrepreneurial experience improves founders’
ability to identify promising ideas and commercially exploit them using their acquired
entrepreneurial skills (Rosen, 1972; Cooper et al., 1989; BrÜderl et al., 1992; Teece, 2007;
Callander, 2011). Moreover, because innovative activity is risky and accompanied by
experimentation and problem-solving processes (e.g., Hippel and Tyre, 1995), startup
founders with previous entrepreneurial experience are likely to be more capable at
recognizing risks and developing ideas with commercial potential (e.g., Pisano, 1996;
Bhide, 2000; Hsu, 2007; Baum and Bird, 2009).
While founders’ entrepreneurial experience can make them adept at discovering
new production techniques and play a key role in pioneering innovations (Schumpeter,
1934), founders may also tend to overestimate the quality and prospects of their ideas
(Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Simon and Houghton, 2003). In this regard, incumbents
would be generally cautious about founders’ adverse incentive to overstate and tendency
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to display optimism about the commercial prospects of their innovations, and safeguard
against such risks through contingent payment provisions (e.g., Gallini and Wright, 1990;
Riordan, 1984). Inasmuch as uncertainty about market potential of startups’ ideas and
misrepresentation trigger risks for potential collaborators, startups of serial founders with
an established track record for developing technologies with market potential would be
rated as possessing ideas with good market prospects (e.g., Frank, 1988; Fraser and Greene,
2006).
Specifically, founders who were successful in taking one of their previous ventures
through to the public equity markets (henceforth ‘successful founders’) gain wide
recognition as outstanding innovators (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; Gompers et al., 2010) and
their later startups are likely to be judged positively by exchange partners and investors
(Gompers et al., 2010; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). Studies in management and finance
suggest that prior success of founders in the IPO market serves as credible signal (e.g.,
Gompers et al., 2010; Berk et al., 2004; Sanders and Boivie, 2004). Startups operating in
high-tech sectors, such as software and biotechnology, face the challenge of convincing a
large and diverse group of investors in public equity markets and cannot anticipate an
optimal IPO unless investors are convinced of the venture’s progress and commercial
potential (e.g., Lerner, 1994; Chemmanur and Fulgheiri, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Ritter
and Welch, 2002). In this regard, ventures started by founders with prior IPOs are likely to
be regarded as having attractive market prospects (e.g., Berk et al., 2004; Sanders and
Boivie, 2004).
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that cooperative exchange partners
would be positive about the commercial prospects of startups founded by serial
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entrepreneurs with prior IPOs. Inasmuch as incumbents as see a lower risk of adverse
selection, they will have a reduced need for deferred, contingent payments in cooperative
commercialization agreements. As a result, I expect startups founded by successful
founders to enjoy higher upfront payments when they enter into such agreements. I thus
posit:
Hypothesis 3.2 A successful founder on a startup’s founding team will have a positive effect
on the proportion of upfront payments the startup receives in a
cooperative commercialization agreement.
3.2.3

Founders’ Credentials and Complementarity
When incumbents enter into collaborative commercialization with early stage

startups, they face uncertainty about the technical prospects and market potential of
startups’ ideas. On the one hand, ideas of startups may contain technical and intangible
aspects that are privately known to the startup and hard to evaluate by outsiders, creating
uncertainty about technical feasibility. On the other hand, insofar as the pre-contractual
assessment of the commercial potential of startups’ ideas is difficult and filled with
uncertainty, potential exchange partners also face uncertainty and risk of adverse selection
about the market potential of startups’ ideas.
Broadly, incumbents face the risk of adverse selection when evaluating the
technical and commercial feasibility of startups’ ideas. In this regard, startups that are able
to simultaneously signal their technical and commercial prospects are likely to perceived
as most promising startups in the market for ideas and obtain superior payment structures.
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Earlier, I argued that a star founder (H1) modifies information about the technical
feasibility of startups’ ideas and positively impacts the proportion of their cash payments.
While founders’ superior scientific accomplishments can establish credibility for the
quality of startups’ technical projects and ease adverse selection risks for incumbents,
incumbent partners would also be highly concerned about the commercial prospects of
startups’ ideas.
Incumbents entering into collaborative commercialization agreements with startups
invest in startup firms and commit their scarce organizational resources for further
development and commercialization of startups’ nascent innovations (e.g., Teece, 1986;
Lerner and Merges, 1998; Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Gans et al., 2002).
Consequently, incumbents would look to insure against possible risks pertaining to the
overall success of startups’ ideas, and their assessment about startups’ ideas would be
comprehensive and tied to the commercial promise, as well as technical quality, of startups’
ideas.
Whereas startups that have scientific stars on their founding team are likely to be
viewed as having ideas with excellent technical quality and less risky, incumbents are not
entirely relieved of adverse selection risk as they also would be wary about commercial
viability of startups’ ideas. Founders who are technically specialized may be exceptional
at applying their deep domain knowledge to create technically robust ideas, yet they may
not be equipped with much needed understanding about commercial research opportunities
(e.g., Knockaert et al., 2011). While having scientific star founders can be valuable in
deepening a startup’s research activities and developing possible solutions to technical
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problems, a startup’s substantial problem is to also consolidate their R&D projects and
technical ideas into commercially promising innovations (e.g., Pisano, 1994; Jong, 2006).
Based on the foregoing arguments, startups that can demonstrate the scientific
feasibility of their ideas can be further better-off within cooperative commercialization
agreements when startups can also credibly establish the commercial promise of their
nascent innovations for

incumbent

partners.

Indeed,

startup founders’

prior

commercialization experience and acquired innovative abilities largely shape the
commercial development and orientation of startups’ technologies (e.g., Feeser and
Willard, 1990; Shane and Stuart, 2002).

For example, in my empirical setting of

biotechnology, founding team’s ability to manage R&D projects and guide them through
the product development and commercialization stages is regarded as highly valuable (e.g.,
Schoemaker and Schoemaker, 1998) in shaping commercial prospects of startups’ projects.
Prior research suggests that previous entrepreneurial experience improves
founders’ ability to identify promising ideas and commercially exploit them using their
acquired entrepreneurial skills (Rosen, 1972; Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979; Cooper et al.,
1989; BrÜderl et al., 1992; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Teece, 2007; Callander, 2011). In
particular, founders who have achieved success in their previous entrepreneurial endeavors
are known to be adept at discovering new production techniques and are more likely to
have developed expertise in pioneering innovations that are technically solid with high
commercial value (Schumpeter, 1934; McGee et al., 1995; Arvanitis and Stucki, 2012).
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials of startup founders collectively modify startups’ information structure and
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credibly signal about the technical and commercial prospects of startups’ ideas to
incumbent partners. Because scientific star founders are technically specialized, they can
be effective in mitigating adverse selection risks for incumbent partners only about
technical prospects of startups’ ideas. However, if these startups also have a founder with
prior entrepreneurial success then adverse risks that incumbents might perceive about
startups’ commercial prospects would also be reduced, and thus they would be able to
negotiate far higher fraction of upfront payments. Therefore, I intuit that star credentials
and entrepreneurial accomplishments function as complementary signals in positively
shaping the proportion of upfront payments obtained by startups. I thus posit:
Hypothesis 3.3 The positive effect of a star founder on the proportion of upfront payments
that a startup receives in a cooperative commercialization agreement will
be greater when the startup also has a successful founder on its founding
team.
3.2.4

Startup Development and Contingent Effects of Founders’ Credentials
Information environment of startups will influence the beliefs of collaborative

partners and determines their allocation of financial resources to startups (e.g., Leland and
Pyle, 1977). While the hypothesized founders’ credentials function as signals and
positively modify the information environment about startups’ projects, their signaling
value also varies according to the developments that take place in startups’ research
projects and activities.
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When startups’ ideas and projects are in the initial stages of development, verifiable
information about the technical progress of their ideas is very limited and, therefore,
exchange partners would not be able to assess the technical prospects of startups’ projects
in these situations. Shortage of information about the technical aspects of the project raises
uncertainty about the technical feasibility of the startup’s project and would preclude
incumbents from providing financial support to the startups’ projects. Incumbents would
rather be inclined to stage their financing in early stage startups based on milestone
attainments. In contrast, when startups’ projects achieve technical outcomes, such as the
design of a prototype or published results, feasibility could be gauged based on the
produced technical information, meanwhile estimating their commercial prospects of the
projects would still be difficult.
Startups in high-tech industries are usually backed by venture capital investments
and the performance of startups in venture rounds would be indicative of the underlying
nature of startups’ projects. Typically, venture capitalists (VCs) invest in highly uncertain
prospects and overcome informational asymmetries by staging their investments in startups
(e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). VCs monitor the progress of startups
and warrant capital infusion in startups based on the progress of their proposed projects
(e.g., Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003) and retain right to abandon a startup
whose prospects appear dull (Sahlman, 1990). VCs provide milestone-based financing to
startups during their formative stages, and as information is produced on the prospects of
startups’ projects, VCs escalate their investments in these startups and advance their
commitment into later rounds of financing (e.g., Lerner, 1994).
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The above evidence points that the investment activity of VCs credibly broadcasts
information to external resource providers and signals to collaborative partners about the
prospects of startups’ projects. In this regard, I argue that the relevance of my hypothesized
variables would be contingent on the stage of VC investment in startups. Specifically, for
a startup that is in early-stages of VC investment, incumbents are subject to asymmetric
information about the technical progress of the startup’s research projects and their
commitment of financial capital to the startup will be largely contingent on milestones.
However, a star founder on the startup’s founding team credibly signals to incumbents
about the technical prospects of the startup’s projects and reduces the risk of adverse
selection for incumbents about startups that are in their early-stages. Alternately, when a
startup progressed beyond early-stages of VC investment, it credibly conveys to
incumbents about the technical prospects of startup’s projects and the startup will be able
to obtain higher proportion of upfront payments. Yet, credible signals about commercial
prospects of startup’s projects and ideas would further induce incumbents to provide a
higher portion of upfront payment. In particular, a startup firm which progressed to later
stages of VC financing would be able to obtain higher fraction of upfront payment if it is
also founded by an entrepreneur with prior IPOs. I thus posit:
Hypothesis 3.4 The positive effect of a star founder on the proportion of upfront payments
that a startup receives in a cooperative commercialization agreement will
be greater for a startup in early-stages of VC investment.
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Hypothesis 3.5 The positive effect of a successful founder on the proportion of upfront
payments that a startup receives in a cooperative commercialization
agreement will be greater for a startup that has progressed beyond earlystages of VC investment.
3.3

Methods

3.3.1

Data and Sample
To test the hypotheses for this study, I use a dataset of cooperative

commercialization agreements (such as licensing and collaborative R&D agreements)
between startups and incumbent firms in the biopharmaceutical industry. The empirical
setting of biopharmaceutical industry is suitable to investigate my hypotheses for several
reasons. First, the industry is driven by scientific discoveries and laboratory experiments,
and is representative of the features of market for ideas and technologies (e.g., Gans, Hsu,
and Stern, 2002; Arora and Gambardella, 2010) in which startup innovators trade their
technologies and ideas by entering into R&D licensing and collaborative agreements.
Second, startups and incumbent firms in the biopharmaceutical industry often engage in
early stage collaborative activity to develop drugs and obtain commercial success (e.g.,
Pisano, 1990; Powell, Koput, and Doerr-Smith, 1996; Jones and Clifford, 2005). Typically,
in this industry the compensation incumbent firms provide to startups during collaborative
agreements is structured in terms of upfront payments, milestone payments, and royalties
(e.g., Higgins, 2007). Third, startups taking part in these alliances often have short track
records and difficult-to-evaluate technological resources and capabilities (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Nicholson, Danzon, and Mccullough, 2005; Levitas and McFayden, 2009). Finally,
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these startups and their collaborative agreements are well documented in this industry,
providing rich information for modeling as well as for drawing comparison with prior
alliance research.
In this study, I examine the determinants of the proportion of upfront payments
startups receive in cooperative commercialization agreements. To this end, I assembled the
list of VC-backed startups in the biopharmaceutical industry from Thomson Reuters’
VentureXpert database. Venture capitalists focus their investments in information
technology and biotechnology industries (e.g., Hsu, 2006) and play a significant role in
providing private financing to startup firms in these sectors (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Zucker,
Darby, Brewer, 1998). I assembled data on startup licensing agreements and collaborations
in the biopharmaceutical industry between 1990-2012 from Thomson Reuters’ Recap
database, which is considered robust and representative in its coverage of alliance
agreements in this industry (Schilling, 2009). Data from Recap has been used extensively
by researchers in management, economics, and finance to investigate startup activities such
as cooperative strategies in the biopharmaceuticals industry (e.g., Robinson and Stuart,
2007). In their data, Recap denotes the party that provides the intellectual property,
technology, and R&D services, as the R&D firm, and the counterparty that obtains the
license as the client firm. In addition, they also provide information about the payments
client firms provide to startups.
I identified founders for all the startup firms obtained from VentureXpert. I relied
on various sources to collect information about founders. Specifically, I used BioScan,
VentureXpert, Bloomberg Businessweek, and company websites to collect names of
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founders. In addition, I also used sources such as SEC filings, LexisNexis, and other web
searches to obtain the names of all possible unique founders for each firm in my data set.
In my data of firm founders, I have 229 unique founders. I tracked the career histories of
all the 229 founders in the sample using LinkedIn, company websites, university web
pages, and other sources such as Bloomberg Investing to construct founder-level
explanatory and control variables. Furthermore, I used Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science
to collect information on scientific publications of founders in my data set.
In this study, I am mainly interested in the role of startup founders’ credentials in
determining the proportion of upfront payments during licensing and R&D agreements
when the startup lacked a technological track record. Accordingly, I identified alliances
that are formed before the startup obtained its first patent grant by combining the alliance
data of VC-backed startup firms with patent information from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) after
tracking company histories and name changes. In order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity
from cross-border transactions and maintain consistency with the patent information from
USPTO and NBER, I limited my analyses to firms founded in the United States.
Additionally, I excluded alliances where the startup firms received their last round
of VC funding at least seven years before the time of alliance, in order to exclude firms
that are defunct, or “living dead” (e.g., Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean, 1992; Mason and
Harrison, 2002). Because all the startups in my sample are venture backed, I also
considered only those alliances that were formed after the startup’s first round of VC
funding. After applying these sampling screens, I obtained a final sample of 263 alliance
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agreements which are indicated by Recap as collaboration, development, co-development,
and research type agreements of 132 distinct human therapeutic biotech startups.
3.3.2

Measures and Analysis

Dependent Variable
I examine the proportion of upfront payment obtained at the contracting stage by a
startup. Financial payments to fledgling startups during alliance agreements with
incumbents often comprise of payments such as upfront payments, milestone payments,
and royalties. While both milestone payments and royalties are contingent on a specified
outcome such as a developed product or sales in product market, upfront payments are
funds that the startup earns upon formation of the alliance and are available for immediate
investment. So, startup firms are likely to have a preference for obtaining the value of their
innovations upfront, because they are immediately realized and can mitigate resource
constraints for early stage startups. At the same time, partners paying upfront are exposed
to a higher risk of adverse selection, and can reduce such risks through deferred, contingent
payments. Accordingly, I modeled Proportion of Upfront Payment as the fraction of total
agreement value obtained as an upfront payment. Given that the dependent variable in this
study is a fractional outcome ranging from 0 to 1, I follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996)
and employ the fractional logistic regression approach, which is based on the binomial
family and logistic link function within the generalized linear models framework. In
supplemental analyses, I also used generalized linear regression models to examine effect
of my hypothesized founders’ credentials on logged values of agreement value and upfront
amount and found similar interpretations as those presented below (p<0.01 and p<0.01,
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respectively for agreement value; p<0.001 and p<0.05, respectively for upfront amount).
I also used robust standard errors clustered by startup because some startups are involved
in more than one alliance in the final sample.
Independent Variables
The first hypothesis posited that the proportion of upfront payments is positively
related to Star Founders in the startup’s founding team. Prior research has operationalized
this variable in different ways. Zucker and Darby (1996) identified star founders on the
basis of the number of scientific articles published until 1990 that reported the discovery
of at least one among the 40 genetic sequences which were described in GenBank (1990).
Zucker and Darby (2006) used data of citation counts and publications of scientific articles
provided by ISIHighlycited.com and ISI Web of Science to identify top researchers in
science and engineering. Rothaermel and Hess (2007) constructed their measure of star
scientists by compiling publication and citation information for all scientists working at
various pharmaceutical firms in their sample, and identified stars as those who had received
citations at least two standard deviations above the mean. Higgins, Stephan, and Thursby
(2011) defined stars as university-affiliated researchers who are scientifically
accomplished by identifying university scientists who won a Nobel Prize.
Considering these differences in defining stars based upon the focus and time frame
of previous studies, I followed Rothaermel and Hess’ (2007) approach since it is
operationalizable across the long sequence of startup and alliance activity in my data set.
Accordingly, I searched for publication and citation data of all founders in my sample of
firm founders in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science database (formerly ISI Web of
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Knowledge) and identified publications for each founder by mapping their name, scientific
field of study, and list of affiliated organizations. I extracted publication and citation
information for all founders during the period 1990-2012 who published scientific articles
in fields related to biotechnology, pharmaceutical sciences, and medical sciences. The
average number of citations that founders received for their scientific publications is 9578.
I operationalized Star Founders as number of founders of a startup firm who had been cited
more than two standard deviations above the mean of the natural logarithm of the number
of citations during the 20-year span in my sample. I also performed robustness checks by
constructing this measure using different cutoff values (e.g., one standard deviation above
the mean and different percentiles (90th and 95th)) and found the results to be robust.
Hypothesis 2 posited that a startup founder with a credential of entrepreneurial
success will positively shape the proportion of upfront payments by signaling the
commercial prospects of the startup’s ideas and innovations. Accordingly, I measured
Successful Founders as the number of founders who took public at least one of their
previously founded firm in the biopharmaceutical industry.
My third independent variable is Early Stage of VC Investment. Hypotheses 4 and
5 posit that the positive effect of founders’ scientific credentials and entrepreneurial
credentials on proportion of upfront payments is expected to vary with the startup’s
development. For startup firms, stages of VC investment highly correlate with development
of startups’ ideas and innovations (e.g., Gompers, 1995), and typically ideas and
innovations of startups in their formative stages of development are considered nascent and
their technical quality is highly uncertain (e.g., Hellman and Puri, 2000). Stage of VC
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Investment equals 1 if the startup is in initial stages of VC investment (i.e., seed stage and
early stage of venture financing), and 0 otherwise (e.g., Gompers, 1995).
Control Variables
In my analyses, I controlled for the effects of several variables at the founding team
level, startup firm level, client firm level, and dyadic level that could be correlated to the
above covariates as well as payment structures. To begin with, I measured Former
Employees of Prominent Firms as the number of founders who were previously affiliated
with prominent biopharmaceutical firms. Founding teams that are scientifically prolific
may be considered as having better quality innovations, and therefore I controlled for
founders’ number of scientific publications prior to the focal alliance. Specifically, I
measured Founders’ Publications as the natural logarithm of the scientific publications of
the most published founder among the startup firm’s founding team at the time of the
alliance. The average number of founders’ publications in my sample is 62, and the
maximum number of publications is 1323. All results are robust to alternative measurement
of founders’ publications in terms of total and average values of publications of the
founding team at the time of alliance.
While a granted patent resolves uncertainty about the startup’s underlying
technological nature (e.g., Gans et al., 2008), in its absence client firms can draw inferences
about the unobservable quality of the startup’s knowledge base and innovations based on
the number of patent applications filed by the startup firm prior to the alliance (e.g.,
Haussler et al., 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). I control for the startup firm’s difficult to
observe technological endowments the absence of a granted patent by measuring Startup
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Patent Applications as the number of patent applications filed by the startup firm prior to
the alliance agreement. I also controlled for alliance activity of the startup firm, because
the number of alliances that the startup firm was able to form even while it did not obtain
a patent is indicative that the startup firm was subject to evaluations of quality by previous
alliance partners (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000) that enhances their credibility in
the market for ideas. In addition, it also conveys information about its visibility and outside
options in these markets, as well as its ability to be effective at engaging in licensing and
collaborative activities with alliance partners (e.g., Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005;
Hagedoorn et al., 2011). I measured Startup Alliance Experience as the number of alliances
formed by the startup firm at the time of alliance to control for the startup firm’s alliance
activity and network (e.g., Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008).
The biopharmaceutical startups in my data set are venture-backed, so I collected a
vector of controls capturing the characteristics of the venture capitalist firm (VC firm)
backing the startup firm and the venture funding received by the startup firm at the time of
the potential alliance. Startup firms that obtained the backing of prominent VC firms would
be able to distinguish themselves as having better prospects and obtain benefits in various
market contexts (Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al.,
2013). To control for the effects of prominent VC affiliations on the proportion of upfront
payments, I first calculated the prominence of VC firms as the Bonacich centrality measure
(Bonacich, 1987; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Next, I measured VC Prominence of the
startup firms at the time of the alliance as a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1
if the Bonacich VC centrality measure of the most central VC backing the startup firm at
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the time of the alliance is greater than the median of VC centrality in the entire sample, and
0 otherwise (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). In supplemental analysis, I also measured VC
prominence as the centrality measure of the most prominence VC firm backing the startup
firm as well as the average centrality measure of VC firms backing the startup firm, and I
found my results below are robust to these alternative measurements of the variable.
Previous research suggests that the amount of VC funding received by a startup firm is
indicative of a startup firm’s progress, maturity, and quality (e.g., Sahlman, 1990;
Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995). Accordingly, I measured Amount of VC Funding as the
natural logarithm of the total dollar amount of VC funding received by the startup firm
prior to the time of alliance.
Alliance characteristics are likely to shape the proportion of upfront payments in a
collaborative agreement. For example, it is possible that clients require a startup to bear a
discount for its first alliance based on the signal the alliance itself sends to outside investors,
so I include the dummy variable First Alliance to address this effect (Nicholson et al.,
2005). Since governance characteristics and payment structures jointly shape the incentive
and control features of collaborative agreements, I included dummy variables Equity to
indicate whether or not the deal is an equity alliance (Robinson & Stuart, 2007) and
Exclusivity to indicate whether the deal contains terms of exclusivity (Somaya, King, &
Vonortas, 2012). I also included the dummy variable R&D component to control for
whether the alliance agreement encompasses R&D activities (Gulati, 1995). I control for
the stage of the alliance within the drug development cycle and measured Stage of
Agreement as a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the alliance includes discovery,
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preclinical, or lead molecule activities, and 0 otherwise. I also included Agreement Value,
using a log transformation of the total payments to the R&D firm (Robinson & Stuart,
2007).
In addition, I also controlled for features of the client by incorporating an indicator
variable to capture whether the client firm is a prominent pharmaceutical firm by including
a dummy variable Big Pharma Client. I also included an indicator variable Biotech Client
to identify deals where the client firm is an incumbent biotechnology firm (Lerner et al.,
2003). I also measured for the client firm’s alliance formation activity as the natural
logarithm of number of alliances formed by the client firm at the time of the alliance (i.e.,
Client Alliance Experience); the average client firm formed roughly 14 alliances prior to
the focal alliance. I also controlled for the technological capabilities of the client firm by
measuring Client Absorptive Capacity as the natural logarithm of the number of issued
patents at the time of alliance, the average client firm obtained 1108 patents at the time of
alliance. Prior research suggests that public capital markets can also provide financial
resources to new ventures and affect the bargaining power of the partners (Lerner et al.,
2003). Accordingly, I include Biotech Equity Index to control for equity market conditions
in the biopharmaceutical industry (Lerner, 1994). Finally, I also controlled for a series of
fixed effects for the focal therapeutic domain for the alliance (Therapeutic Effects) (Macher
and Boerner, 2006), its technological domain (Technology Effects) (Adegbesan and
Higgins, 2011), and the year in which the collaborative agreement was signed (Year
Effects).
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3.4

Results
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for my sample. The

average proportion of upfront payment is 0.23, and it is positively correlated with star
founders and successful founders (p<0.05, respectively). A startup with a star on its
founding team obtains 24 percent of upfront proportion, while a startup that does not have
a star founder receives only 16 percent (p<0.05). Similarly, a startup founded a successful
founder on an average receives about 26 percent of upfront proportion. In comparison, a
startup that does not have a successful founder receives only 19 percent of the value upfront
(p<0.05). In addition, while 14 percent of the sampled collaborative agreements were first
alliances of startups, such agreements also tended to obtain 15 percent of the total value as
upfront payments (26 percent for others; p<0.01). Overall the correlations suggest no
multicollinearity concerns. The maximum variance inflation factor is 2.51, which is well
below the rule of thumb value of ten used to indicate multicollinearity problems (Neter et
al., 1989). The maximum condition number is 9.76, which is below the threshold value of
30, indicating that there are no severe multicollinearity concerns (Belsley et al., 1980).
Table 3.2 reports the estimates of fractional logistic regression models for the
proportion of upfront payments received by the startup. Model 1 is the baseline
specification model consisting of control variables. Model 2 augments model 1 and shows
the direct effects of my hypothesized variables. The first hypothesis predicted that a
startups founded by star founders will receive greater portions of upfront payment in
collaborative agreements. Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient estimate of star
founders is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). I estimated the economic
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significance of a star founder on a startup’s ability to obtain higher proportion of upfront
payments. With all the other covariates at their means, a startup that has a star founder in
its founding team increases the proportion of upfront payment by 47 percent. In hypothesis
2, I predicted a similar positive effect for founders’ commercial credentials. The coefficient
estimate of successful founders is positive and significant (p<0.05). The
effect is economically meaningful, as I find that an average startup founded by a successful
founder increases the proportion of upfront amount it obtains by 53 percent.
Table 3.3 reports all hypothesized interactions in this study. Model 1 captures the
interaction between star founders and successful founders posited in Hypothesis 3.
Specifically, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive effect of a star founder will be more
pronounced for a startup that also has a successful founder in its founding team. Consistent
with this prediction, the coefficient estimate of the interaction between star founders and
successful founders is positive and significant (p<0.001). Models 2 and 3 in Table 3.3
illustrate the interactions between stage of VC investment and the hypothesized founders’
credentials in this study. Specifically, Hypotheses 4 suggests that the positive effect of a
star founder on the proportion of upfront payments will be greater when the startup is in its
initial stages of development, because client firms will be concerned about the technical
prospects of the startup firm during these stages of development. The coefficient estimate
of the interaction variable is not significant and does not support my prediction; however
the coefficient estimate is positive and significant (p<0.1) in the full model (Model 4).
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Table 3.2. Fractional Logit Regression Estimatesa
Variables
Constant

1
0.221
(1.423)
306.06***
22.66***
29.36***
1.227*
(0.613)
-0.163
(0.119)
0.004
(0.041)
0.378
(0.352)
-0.496*
(0.250)
-0.586***
(0.075)
-0.524*
(0.243)
-0.636†
(0.369)
0.120
(0.375)
-0.248
(0.229)
-1.219**
(0.445)
-0.102
(0.113)
0.236
(0.262)
-0.232
(0.155)
0.022**
(0.008)
0.026
(0.060)
-0.189
(0.297)
-0.476†
(0.271)

2
1.388
(1.412)
Year Effectsb
310.28***
Technology Effectsb
23.36***
b
Therapeutic Effects
37.49***
Biotech Equity Index
0.857
(0.609)
Client Alliance Experience
-0.169
(0.112)
Client Absorptive Capacity
-0.001
(0.044)
Big Pharma Client
0.461
(0.356)
Biotech Client
-0.476*
(0.237)
Agreement Value
-0.582***
(0.073)
Stage of Agreement
-0.598*
(0.245)
R&D Component
-0.681†
(0.359)
Exclusivity
0.137
(0.359)
Equity
-0.250
(0.208)
First Alliance
-1.221**
(0.435)
Amount of VC Funding
-0.163
(0.106)
VC Prominence
0.251
(0.258)
Startup Alliance Experience
-0.283†
(0.165)
Startup Patent Applications
0.023**
(0.009)
Founders’ Publications
-0.037
(0.064)
Former Employees of Prominent Firms
-0.269
(0.254)
Early Stage of VC Investment
-0.484†
(0.267)
Star Founders
0.574*
(0.253)
Successful Founders
0.668*
(0.320)
Log likelihood
-86.78
-85.56
Wald χ2
866.27***
921.71***
a
***
**
*
†
N=263. p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
b 2
χ values for joint significance of fixed effects.
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Table 3.3. Estimates for Interaction Effects of Founders’ Credentialsa
Variables
Constant
Year Effectsb
Technology Effectsb
Therapeutic Effectsb
Biotech Equity Index
Client Alliance Experience
Client Absorptive Capacity
Big Pharma Client
Biotech Client
Agreement Value
Stage of Agreement
R&D Component
Exclusivity
Equity
First Alliance
Amount of VC Funding
VC Prominence
Startup Alliance Experience
Startup Patent Applications
Founders’ Publications
Former Employees of Prominent
Firms
Early Stage of VC Investment
Star Founders
Successful Founders
Star Founders*Successful Founders
Star Founders* Early Stage of VC
Investment
Successful Founders*Stage of VC
Investment
Log likelihood
Wald χ2

1
0.537
(1.451)
289.87***
28.83***
38.14***
1.223*
(0.623)
-0.128
(0.113)
0.010
(0.043)
0.429
(0.349)
-0.383†
(0.226)
-0.601***
(0.075)
-0.465†
(0.245)
-0.784*
(0.366)
0.219
(0.372)
-0.161
(0.213)
-1.159**
(0.430)
-0.143
(0.106)
0.296
(0.258)
-0.250
(0.160)
0.023**
(0.008)
-0.033
(0.061)
-0.401
(0.262)
-0.454†
(0.276)
1.057***
(0.245)
0.442
(0.335)
0.646***
(0.070)

2
1.354
(1.417)
307.49***
22.53***
36.68***
0.846
(0.619)
-0.169
(0.112)
-0.007
(0.044)
0.479
(0.355)
-0.491*
(0.236)
-0.578***
(0.073)
-0.592*
(0.246)
-0.668†
(0.358)
0.097
(0.368)
-0.292
(0.221)
-1.196**
(0.432)
-0.160
(0.105)
0.271
(0.262)
-0.258
(0.162)
0.023**
(0.009)
-0.031
(0.066)
-0.251
(0.257)
-0.483†
(0.266)
0.280
(0.468)
0.709*
(0.319)

3
0.945
(1.447)
289.42***
22.54***
37.93***
1.039†
(0.631)
-0.156
(0.111)
-0.005
(0.044)
0.491
(0.359)
-0.449†
(0.233)
-0.583***
(0.073)
-0.597*
(0.247)
-0.676†
(0.348)
0.111
(0.352)
-0.201
(0.204)
-1.234**
(0.438)
-0.159
(0.105)
0.278
(0.261)
-0.255
(0.159)
0.024**
(0.009)
-0.022
(0.063)
-0.277
(0.253)
-0.550*
(0.263)
0.469†
(0.248)
0.817*
(0.331)

0.131
(0.160)

-84.73
1130.72***

-85.49
922.95***

-0.530*
(0.246)
-85.24
978.07***

4
0.112
(1.493)
302.91***
22.53***
37.93***
1.367*
(0.650)
-0.117
(0.112)
-0.002
(0.042)
0.483
(0.350)
-0.387†
(0.225)
-0.596***
(0.075)
-0.448†
(0.249)
-0.772*
(0.358)
0.136
(0.376)
-0.188
(0.223)
-1.113**
(0.427)
-0.134
(0.104)
0.355
(0.263)
-0.183
(0.155)
0.024**
(0.008)
-0.011
(0.061)
-0.393
(0.265)
-0.500†
(0.267)
0.443
(0.415)
0.601†
(0.345)
0.677***
(0.071)
0.249†
(0.148)
-0.394†
(0.234)
-84.34
1307.43***

N=263. . *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. bχ2 values for joint significance of
fixed effects

a
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In Hypothesis 5, I posited that the positive effect of a successful founder will be
stronger for a startup firm that progressed into later stages of development where concerns
about the commercial potential of its ideas will be greater for client firms. The coefficient
of the interaction variable is negative and significant (p<0.05), supporting the prediction
that the positive effect of successful founders will be prominent when the startup advances
to later stages of development. The marginal effects of all the interactions are also
consistent with my interpretations.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical illustration of the complementary effect between
star founders and successful founders. The positive effect of a star founder on the
proportion of upfront payments will be enhanced by almost 60 percent when there is also
a successful founder on the startup’s founding team.

Figure 3.1. Interaction Effect between Star Founders and Successful Founders on
Proportion of Upfront Payments
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This offers support for my prediction about the complementarity between founders’
entrepreneurial credentials and scientific credentials in mitigating asymmetric information
about the startup’s technical and commercial prospects, respectively. Figure 3.2 shows the
negative interaction between successful founders and stage of VC investment. The positive
effect of a successful founder on the proportion of payment obtained upfront by the startup
will be twofold when the startup firm advances to later stages of development, when the
commercial prospects of the startup are more pertinent for the client firm.

Figure 3.2. Interaction Effect between Successful Founders and Early Stage of VC
Investment on Proportion of Upfront Payments

I also investigated the robustness of my results in several ways. First, I investigated
whether the above results were potentially subject to sample selection bias. In my empirical
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analysis, it is likely that the hypothesized founder variables and unobserved factors might
influence the formation of alliances for the startups in my sample and bias the
interpretations. To determine selection bias, in supplemental analyses I used two-stage
Heckman method. Specifically, I formulated a first-stage probit model for alliance
formation by constructing the list of unrealized alliances from the universe of startups that
potentially could have been considered for alliance by the client firm when it formed a deal
with the focal startup firm. In the second-stage when I performed a linear regression of
logged values of upfront amount on all the explanatory variables and the correction term
obtained from first-stage, the coefficient of the selection correction term was insignificant
(t = -1.07, n.s.) and indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no sample
selection bias. Supplemental analyses using Tobit models for my dependent variable
yielded the same inferences as those presented above. I also used generalized linear
regression models to examine whether my hypothesized variables have any significant
effect on logged values of agreement value and upfront amount. The results indicate that
both star founders and successful founders positively affect the total agreement value
(p<0.01 and p<0.01, respectively) and size of upfront payment (p<0.001 and p<0.05,
respectively), supporting the intuition that founders’ credentials play a significant role in
shaping favorable payment terms for startups.
Results for some of the control variables are also notable. The coefficient estimate
for startup’s patent applications is positive and significant (p<0.01). This result lends
support for the role of patent applications in reducing uncertainty and risk of adverse
selection for buyers of innovations and innovative R&D services in the market for ideas

92

(e.g., Gans and Stern, 2003; Gans et al., 2008), and more generally for startups’ resource
providers (e.g., Haussler et al., 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). This study also finds
support for the idea that startups incur less favorable payment structures in their first
collaborative agreement. Specifically, the coefficient estimate of first alliance is negative
and significant (p<0.01). In addition, when startups sell their innovations to incumbent
biotech firms, they are likely obtain higher proportion of upfront payments (p<0.05)
because biotech client firms are better able to evaluate biotech startups’ underlying
technological endowments.
3.5

Discussion

3.5.1

Contributions and Implications
In this study, I extend ideas proposed in information economics about remedies for

adverse selection risks and examine the mechanisms through which startups can prevail
over the adverse effects of informational asymmetries and uncertainties which restrict their
early stage growth opportunities. Broadly, the theoretical contribution of this study is that
founders’ credentials play an influential role in determining returns from their ideas within
early stage cooperative commercialization exchanges with incumbents. Specifically, I
suggest and show that startup founders’ technical and entrepreneurial accomplishments can
reduce adverse risks for incumbents by credibly signaling the value of their startups’ latent
ideas and technologies to incumbents and accomplish favorable payment structures during
collaborative exchanges. Moreover, out findings support the intuitive notion that the two
distinct founders’ credentials – star founders and successful founders – would complement
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each other, and their prominence on payment structures would vary with stages of startup’s
venture activity.
In this study I highlight the role of founders’ accomplishments as signaling devices
for early stages startups’ latent quality and contribute in several ways to research on
cooperative commercialization strategies of new ventures in strategy and entrepreneurship.
For the strategy literature, I build upon the recent stream of research on market for ideas
and technologies (e.g., Arora et al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003, 2010) and extend
information economics to examine the underexplored aspect of startup performance –
payment structures in cooperative agreements. Specifically, this study contributes to the
research on market for ideas and collaborative R&D partnerships by suggesting that startup
founders’ credentials play an important role in reducing risks of adverse selection for
prospective partners and shaping favorable compensation structures for startups.
For the entrepreneurship literature, this study sheds light on a fresh aspect of startup
performance by investigating the structure of payments startups receive in their strategic
and collaborative partnerships. Prior research on startup performance has emphasized
liquidity events such as initial public offerings (IPO) or being acquired, and this research
has also emphasized the role that signals from venture capitalists and other interorganizational relationships can play (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati & Higgins, 2003;
Chang, 2004; Brau et al., 2010). Whereas the event of going public and the value attained
during an IPO are crucial for the survival and success of new ventures (e.g., Stinchcombe,
1965), it is also worth investigating how privately held young startups can yet obtain value
from their organizational resources and gather additional resources even as they are lacking
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networks and track records. I complement this stream of work by arguing that during
startups’ early stages credentials of founders can affect the perceptions of outsiders by
signaling the value of their startups’ inherent quality and shaping the terms of payments
startups receive in alliance agreements. In future research it will be interesting to examine
how founding team credentials can also determine the extent of value startups can attract
in the public equity markets and prior to going public, including ties to venture capitalists,
corporate venture capitalists, and universities, among others. While I showed that founders’
credentials can influence the structure of payments, it will be interesting to examine how
founding team credentials shape other features of alliance design such as governance
choice, allocation of control rights and structure of cooperative commercialization
agreements with established firms (e.g., Gulati 1995; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Anand and
Khanna, 2000; Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Li et al., 2008).
I also contribute to research applying signaling theory to examine the different
types of signals that enable performance for new ventures in various market contexts. This
stream of research has shown that ties to prominent organizations such as venture
capitalists reduces adverse selection risk by signaling quality and thereby helps startups
gain access to various resources required for their growth and survival (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006, Ozmel et al., 2013). My study complements
this stream of work by demonstrating the instrumental role that founders’ credentials play
in signaling the underlying nature and quality of early stage startups’ ideas and
accomplishing favorable payment structures in collaborative exchanges. Given that firms
can signal their prospects in several different ways (e.g., Riley, 2001; Long, 2002; Certo,
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2003; Hsu, 2006; Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Connelly et al., 2011), for future research it
will be interesting to examine the relationship between these other signals and founders’
credentials in determining outcomes for startup firms in various market contexts.
This study also contributes to research on founders’ human capital and networks in
enhancing performance and growth prospects of entrepreneurial firms (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997; Baum et al., 2000; Colombo and Grili, 2005;
Delmar and Shane, 2006; Eesley and Roberts, 2012) and alliance formation (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart et al., 2007; Hallen, 2008; Luo et al., 2009). I
complement prior research by explicating two distinct credentials of founders and
suggesting that they positively correlate with unobservable human capital (e.g., Spence,
1973; Coff, 1997) and reduce information asymmetries about an early stage startup’s ideas
and obtain favorable payment structures in interfirm collaborations. Furthermore, my
theory about the role of founding team in enabling cooperative strategies for startup firms
complements the research on top management team (TMT) experience and prestige of
performance of new ventures (Kor, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Kroll et al., 2007; Certo
et al., 2001; Certo, 2003). Given that there is more than one type of founders’ credentials,
it will be interesting to examine how they interact with each other and shape innovative
performance and outcomes for startups in various market contexts.
Finally, I contribute to research on resource-based theory (RBT) (e.g., Penrose,
1959; Wernefelt, 1984) and resource based view (e.g., Barney 1991) and complement
emerging stream of research about the role of founders’ experience and human captial (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Chandler and Hanks, 1998)
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by demonstrating that credentials of founders can also be instrumental as “resources” for
startup firms (Brush et al., 2001) during their founding stages , and provide signaling
services and compensate for the lack of a patent (e.g., Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
3.5.2

Limitations and Future Research Directions
In addition to the research opportunities discussed above, future research might also

address several limitation of this study. First, this study examines an underexplored
dimension of alliance design - payment structures in alliance agreements, and investigates
how founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial credentials shape favorable payment
structures for startups in terms of favorable proportion of upfront payments. In future
research, it would be valuable to examine how founders’ credentials and human capital
affect the choice of hybrid forms of governance, such as equity, non-equity, and so forth.
It would also be useful to examine how founders’ credentials provide signaling and
bargaining benefits to startups and influence the controls rights allocation between startups
and incumbents in cooperative commercialization agreements. Moreover, the empirical
context for this study is biotechnology sector, where patents offer strong appropriability
for firms and where cooperative commercialization activity between upstream suppliers
and downstream firms is significant. It would therefore be interesting to examine how
credentials of the founders are relevant in other empirical contexts where appropriability
regimes are weak, or based on secrecy in reducing adverse selection risks and shaping
payment structure for early stage startups. Furthermore, it will be useful to examine
whether effect of founders’ credentials on reducing informational asymmetries are
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contingent on other signaling mechanisms such as venture capital certification, contracts
and warranties.
Second, because this study has focused on early stage startups that lack a patent
grant, in future work it will be valuable to investigate how the signaling benefits of
founders’ credentials in conveying information about the unobservable quality of the
startup’s knowledge vary with the startup’s patenting track record and its patenting quality
(e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
Third, while I focus on determinants of payments structures for early stage startups,
my study is also silent on the implications of this facet of alliance design. It would be
valuable to probe the dynamics of these agreements to study the payments that startups
actually receive and how they renegotiate payment terms over time as information is
produced on them. In addition, my theoretical focus has been on the startup and how signals
of quality enable it to get gainful payment terms in alliances, so it would also be useful to
study whether partners also benefit from reduced adverse selection in their partnerships
and the terms they use to capture value.
3.6

Conclusion
In this study, I investigate the effect of founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial

credentials on an underexplored dimension of alliance contracting, that is payment
structures, to provide new evidence about the signaling role of founders’ distinct
credentials. Specifically, I show that startup founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials function as credible signals, and consequently shape favorable payment
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structures in terms of better proportion of upfront payments for startups by reducing the
risk of adverse selection for cooperative commercialization partners about the inherent
quality of startups’ ideas. Further, I also show that founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials complement each other and collectively enhance startups’ prospects for better
payment structures by conveying information about the technical as well as commercial
prospects of startups’ technologies. I also show that the effect of founders’ scientific and
entrepreneurial credentials on upfront proportion varies with the stage of startup’s venture
activity.
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CHAPTER 4. FOUNDERS’ CREDENTIALS AND INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERINGS OF STARTUPS
4.1

Introduction
Going public marks an important milestone in the growth of many high-tech

startups. These firms lack the necessary organizational and financial resources that are
required for pursuing their growth prospects, and startups rely on external resource
providers to secure resources and ensure their survival (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965).
Specifically, high-tech startups rely on outsiders such as venture capitalists, alliance
partners, or consider going to public equity markets to finance their internal projects (e.g.,
Sahlman, 1990; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Pisano, 1989; Nicholson et al., 2005; Stuart et
al., 1999).
Among the several options for high-tech startups to acquire resources, going public
presents several attractive features for startups. For example, by going public startups can
gain increased liquidity and easier access to a larger pool of capital (e.g., Chemmanur and
Fulghieri, 1999). Going public generates information on the startup’s commercial
prospects and involves certain costs such as recruitment of underwriters, so startups can
broadly advertise to heterogeneous investors in the equity markets and draw attention of
prospective suppliers, employees, customers, and collaborative partners in the process
(e.g., Certo, 2003). Further, IPOs provide attractive exit options for equity investors in the
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startup such as VCs (e.g., Black and Gilson, 1998). Given these various reasons, an early
IPO can facilitate an organization’s access to resources, growth, and future prospects for
exchange.
However, the decision to public can also be very intimidating for startups as they
also face challenges conveying information about their prospects to potential investors in
public markets. Specifically, high-tech startups’ activities are largely driven by research
and development activities that contain a high degree of intangible aspects and have a long
lead time for realizing cash flows (e.g., Stuart et al., Colombo and Grilli, 2010). As a
consequence, information about the impact of these activities on a startup’s value and
commercial prospects is quite difficult to convey to investors in public equity markets (e.g.,
Fukugawa, 2012). Moreover, startups often lack sufficient track records that might
otherwise address uncertainty about the productive quality of startups’ assets, thereby
diminishing opportunities for startups to attract financing from outside investors (e.g.,
Shane and Stuart, 2002; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
One way in which startups can reduce uncertainty about their quality and produce
information on their underlying asset quality and prospects is by obtaining the affiliation
of prominent outsiders such as VCs who are actively involved in financing high-risk startup
activity (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). However,
startups also have to incur significant cost to gain the endorsement of prominent VCs as
they have to offer equity to the VCs, agree to stringent control and monitoring (e.g., Hsu,
2004) and postpone their plans of going public.
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Similarly, startups can partner with prominent alliance partners to enhance their
performance (e.g., Baum et al., 2000) and signal their quality to outsiders (e.g., Stuart et
al., 1999). However, partnering with prominent partners may not be easy for startups,
particularly those with radical innovations, because prominent partners are likely to be very
selective in their choice of partners (e.g., Li et al., 2008; Ozmel et al., 2013). As a
consequence, startups may incur loss of time while establishing alliances with prominent
partners, or contract with them on less attractive terms (e.g., Danzon et al., 2005).
Additionally, while startups can rely on the quality of their resource base and patent stocks
to obtain resources from outsiders (e.g., Wagner and Cockburn, 2010; Hsu and Ziedonis,
2013), assembling these firm-level resources may take considerable time and resources,
and may also not credibly reduce uncertainty for outside investors about the potential
market prospects of startups’ technologies (e.g., Long, 2002; Gans et al., 2008). Given
these strategic considerations, the question arises whether there are other ways in which
startups might build their credibility and convey information about their prospects to be
able to go public more quickly.
Recognizing that startups’ resources and prospects are rooted in the skills,
knowledge, experience, and overall competences of members of their founding team (e.g.,
Klepper, 2001; Shane and Stuart, 2002), I develop the argument that startup founders play
a central role in determining the startup’s ability to go public by addressing these problems.
Research in entrepreneurship suggests that when startups are in their formative stages
startups’ early projects and strategies are engineered by the human capital endowments of
their founding team members (e.g., Rao, 1994; Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Stuart,
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2002). So, when startups approach potential investors to finance their projects, investors
assess the quality of startups’ intangible assets and their commercial prospects based on
the track records and accomplishments of startup founders themselves (e.g., Amit, Glosten,
and Muller, 1990). Prior research suggests that founders apply their acquired competences
and learning from prior experience when they found startups and critically determine the
quality of the choices startups make and the efficacy of their execution (e.g., Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven, 1990; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Beckman, 2006).
These ideas suggest that founders’ competences and track records are useful initial
endowments for startups for several reasons. First, they are elemental for architecting
startups’ R&D projects, making technology-related choices, and streamlining produce
development strategies. Second, founders’ accomplishments and prior track records
convey information to potential investors about the quality of startups’ proposed
innovations and their commercial prospects. Specifically, the credentials of startups’
founders provide potential investors a basis to learn about the technical and commercial
prospects of startups’ ideas and alter investors’ beliefs about financing startups’ projects
(e.g., Amit et al., 1990). Previous research suggests that the prestige and quality of top
management team and board members can more generally shape organizations’ ability to
attract funding for their projects from private and public investors (e.g., Certo et al., 2001;
Certo, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Beckman and Burton, 2008).
In this study, I build on the above ideas and develop hypotheses about the role of
founders’ credentials and track records on startups’ rate of going public. In my hypotheses,
I propose two distinct credentials of startup founders and suggest that they play a pivotal
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role in positively influencing the startup’s rate of going public. Specifically, I suggest that
startups that have a scientific star or a founder with prior IPO experience on their founding
team are able to go public faster. Given that high-tech startups are generally backed by
venture capitalists (VCs) (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 2001), the quality of
startups’ VC affiliations produce information on the startups’ overall quality and market
prospects for outsiders (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004).
Thus, I posit a contingency between the proposed founder credentials in this study, that is
scientific and entrepreneurial credentials, and other potential means through which startups
can credibly signify their overall prospects for commercial success. In particular, I argue
that the prominence of startups’ VC backing weakens the effect of our proposed founder
credentials on startups’ rate of going public.
At a broad level, I contribute to research in strategy and entrepreneurship on
startups’ IPO timing decisions and IPO performance. Prior research has investigated the
role of startups’ interorganizational relationships and endorsements (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Chang, 2004), top management team’s experience (e.g., Beckman and Burton, 2008)
and prestige (e.g., Certo et al., 2001) on the IPO timing and performance of startups. I
complement this stream of research by showing how specific aspects of founders’
credentials that are indicative of their scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments are
likely to have a strong bearing on startups’ IPO decision.
Second, I extend prior research by showing the contingency between startup
founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments and prominence of startup VC
affiliation on startups’ ability to go public. Prior research has examined how founders’
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human capital and reputation affect the funding startups receive from VCs (e.g., Hsu, 2006;
Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). Other studies have shown how receiving backing by venture
capitalists can help firms go public (Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Chang,
2004; Ozmel et al., 2013). I build upon and complement this research by demonstrating the
importance of founder effects in shaping the timing of firms’ IPOs, and showing that
founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial attainments matter to a greater extent when startups
cannot convey their prospects to potential investors in IPO markets on account of less
prominent VC affiliations.
Finally, I also contribute to literature in strategy and entrepreneurship that has
examined the role of founders on the performance of startups. Specifically, I explore the
role of founder effects on startups’ ability to go for an IPO and achieve faster access to
public equity markets. The findings in this study suggest that founders’ scientific and
entrepreneurial accomplishments play an important role in effecting faster IPOs for
startups. In this manner, I complement prior research (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1990, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Colombo and Grilli, 2010) which suggests the
significance of founder’s experience and competence on the growth and performance of
entrepreneurial ventures.
4.2

Theory and Hypotheses
Many studies in management and economics literatures elucidate various signaling

mechanisms which can enable entrepreneurs and startup firms to obtain necessary
resources of growth in a wide range of market settings (e.g., Amit, Glosten, and Muller,
1990; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999; Certo,
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2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Levitas and McFayden, 2009; Zhang and Wiersema, 2009;
Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). For instance, startup firms can engage in quality certification to
mitigate the risk of adverse selection by contracting with prominent venture capitalists and
prominent exchange partners even on heavily discounted terms (e.g., Hsu, 2004; Nicholson
et al., 2005), to be able to strike future deals with incumbents (e.g, Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et
al., 2013). Startups also invest in boosting their patent portfolios in order to attract external
resource providers and investors (e.g., Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
Some of the above mentioned mechanisms such as prominent affiliations and
patents are costly as well as time consuming for startups to organize, so startups might
produce information about their general prospects through other means and enhance their
ability to access public equity. Specifically, a startup can benefit from the credentials of
the members of its founding team to convey credible information widely about the startup’s
underlying technical and commercial prospects. Indeed, Spence (1973) proposed that
prospective employees who acquired education credentials that are costly to earn and
imitate by others would be perceived superior and offered better compensation by
employers. In the same manner, startups founded by individuals whose credentials are
observable, and yet rare and difficult for other entrepreneurs to accumulate, are likely to
be favored by potential investors.
Observing that the quality of startups’ technologies and growth strategies are
largely shaped by the ability and experience of the startups’ founding team members, I
suggest that startups with highly accomplished founding teams can anticipate a faster IPO.
In the hypotheses below, I propose two distinct credentials of startup founders which

106

potentially can be very instrumental in modifying the information structure of the startup
pertaining to its technical quality and commercial prospects, thereby facilitating the
startup’s chances of going public earlier than other startups. Specifically, I suggest that
founders with superior scientific credentials and prior entrepreneurial experience of taking
their ventures public would be able to credibly mitigate potential investors’ concerns about
startups’ hidden quality and overall prospects, and consequently they would play an
important role in affecting startup’s chances of a faster IPO. Further, I also argue and show
that founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments are particularly
consequential for startups that lack affiliations of prominent VCs.
4.2.1

Scientific Stars
High-tech startups pursue activities that are research intensive and often are driven

by the competence of the startup’s research team. In knowledge-intensive industries,
creation of new knowledge and ideas is an important activity which determines firms’
competitive advantage (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994;
Grant, 1996). Prior research suggests that performance of firms is driven by the explicit
and tacit knowledge of organizational members (e.g., Polanyi, 1966; Nelson and Winter,
1982) and in the case of startups it is largely powered by the scientific expertise and
technical know-how of individuals in the startup’s team (e.g., Chandler and Hanks, 1998;
Argote, 1999; Knockaert et al., 2011). For example, in the biopharmaceuticals industry
research activities precede any product development initiatives, and the quality of research
determines the innovative output of startups (e.g., Pisano, 1994). In this regard, the quality
of a startup’s R&D team is a key contributing factor to the startup’s ability to develop new
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innovative products (e.g., DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999). Specifically, the skills and
knowledge of the startup founders play a pivotal role in determining the direction and depth
of the startup’s research activities and the quality of the startup’s intangible ideas and
knowledge bases (e.g., Teece, 1981; Beckman et al., 2007).
The above insights suggest that the scientific and technical capabilities of startup
founders are central to the quality of startup’s proposed projects and technologies. Previous
research suggests that expert individuals who earned credentials as star scientists enable
firms in knowledge-driven industries such as biotechnology enhance their performance and
innovative output (e.g., Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007).
Generally, in knowledge-driven industries, individuals with star credentials are regarded
highly for their exceptional capability to generate breakthrough ideas and pursue research
projects that whose outcomes are estimable and less uncertain (e.g., Zucker, Darby, and
Armstrong, 1998). These capabilities are particularly valuable for high-tech startups,
whose activities are particularly subject to unforeseeable hazards that may hamper startups’
technical progress and disrupt product development plans.
Because technology trajectories are highly uncertain in high-tech industries and
unforeseen changes could derail startups’ research programs (e.g., Tushman and
Rosenkopf, 1992), outside investors tend to be cautious about them and may not be
favorable towards startups whose technical prospects are laden with uncertainty.
Furthermore, because startups would have incentives to misrepresent their quality and
overstate their prospects (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Eisenhardt, 1989), the technical quality of
high-tech startups is difficult to ascertain for outsiders (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Cumming,

108

2006). Overall, uncertainty about the scientific promise and technical prospects of hightech startups would predictably affect startups’ beliefs about their ability to raise capital in
the public equity markets and their decision to go public.
In this regard, scientific star founder’s scarce technical knowledge that is derived
from prior discovery and research experience is a valuable asset for a high-tech startup
(e.g., Murray, 2002; Junkunc and Eckhardt, 2009), because it not only allows the startup
obtain success in its innovative projects, but also grants credibility to the startup’s proposed
activities (e.g., Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Powers and McDougall, 2005). To the extent
uncertainty about the technical prospects of startups poses hazards for outsiders, startups
founded by scientific stars are likely to be viewed as endowed with promising technological
prospects. The presence of scientific stars on a startup’s founding team therefore modifies
the information structure of the startups about its difficult-to-assess R&D projects and
innovative activities, potentially reducing uncertainty and the risk of adverse selection for
potential investors. Given the signaling benefits that scientific stars bestow to their firms,
a startup founded by scientific star may find it easier to finance their projects through an
IPO. Therefore, I expect startups founded by scientific stars to go public earlier than other
startups. Thus, I posit:
Hypothesis 4.1 A scientific star on a high-tech startup’s founding team will have a positive
effect on the startup’s rate of going public.
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4.2.2

Founder IPO Experience
The foregoing hypothesis suggests how startups’ considerations about being able

to credibly convey their technical prospects to outsiders influences startups’ IPO timing
decisions, and discusses how scientific star founders have a part in enhancing startups’
potential to go for an earlier IPO. While potential investors in public investors would have
problems discerning the hidden technical quality of startups’ innovations, they would also
be concerned about misrepresentation risks related to the likely commercial value of
startups’ innovations.
Specifically, potential investors in public markets would be uncertain about the
startups’ potential to translate innovation into realizable revenue. Potential investors would
be subject to the classical ‘lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 1970) and their misgivings about
startups’ commercial prospects would significantly affect startups’ ability to consider
going public. Most startups are resource-constrained and operate with short track records
(e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; Shane and Stuart, 2002), and usually have limited experience
with organizing product development strategies and often function on ad-hoc procedures
(e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004). In the absence of any credible means through which
startups can convey their commercialization potential and market prospects, startups are
less likely to be able to carry out an IPO to access external sources of funding.
Alternatively, startups can draw on the competence of their founders who have
developed distinguishable abilities, recognition, and also networks through their prior
experience (e.g., Burton et al., 2002; Beckman and Burton, 2008) to drive startups’
commercialization success. Indeed, in their early stages the commercial and market success
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of startups’ anticipated products and technologies are largely determined by founders’
commercialization experience and abilities (e.g., Feeser and Willard, 1990; Shane and
Stuart, 2002). For example, in my empirical setting of biotechnology, entrepreneurs’
ability to manage R&D projects and guide them through the product development and
marketing stages is regarded as scarce and highly valuable (e.g., Schoemaker and
Schoemaker, 1998). This suggests startups can capitalize on the commercialization
expertise and networks of founders to navigate the formidable process of translating
outputs from R&D into profitable revenue streams. Given that startups are subject to
liability of newness and smallness (e.g., Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 1983), founders’
ability to create and identify propitious projects and expertise in captaining their
implementation is an important endowment for startups. Moreover, such skills of founders
are important for startups in reducing concerns of potential outside investors about startups’
chances of achieving success.
Prior research suggests that previous entrepreneurial experience improves
founders’ ability to identify promising ideas and commercially exploit them using their
acquired entrepreneurial skills and networks (Rosen, 1972; Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979;
Cooper et al., 1989; BrÜderl et al., 1992; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Teece, 2007; Callander,
2011). Because building potentially commercializable technology is accompanied by
experimentation and problem-solving processes (e.g., Hippel and Tyre, 1995), startup
founders with prior entrepreneurial experience are likely to be more capable at recognizing
risks and developing ideas with commercial potential (e.g., Pisano, 1996; Bhide, 2000;
Hsu, 2007; Baum and Bird, 2009).
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In particular, founders who have achieved success in their previous entrepreneurial
endeavors are known to be adept at discovering new production techniques and are more
likely to have developed expertise in pioneering innovations that are technically solid with
high commercial value (Schumpeter, 1934; McGee et al., 1995; Arvanitis and Stucki,
2012). Inasmuch as uncertainty about market potential of startups’ ideas triggers risks for
potential investors, startups of serial entrepreneurs who have demonstrated their
competence for developing technologies with market potential and commercial viability
would be in a better position to attract investments for their R&D projects (e.g., Frank,
1988; Fraser and Greene, 2006). Specifically, founders who were able to take one of their
previous ventures public are likely to attain wide recognition as outstanding entrepreneurs
(e.g., Certo et al., 2001; Gompers et al., 2010) and their later startups are likely to be judged
positively by potential investors and collaborators (Gompers et al., 2010; Hsu and Ziedonis,
2013).
Studies in management and finance suggest that prior success of founders in the
IPO market serves as credible signal (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Berk et al., 2004; Sanders
and Boivie, 2004). Because high-tech startups face the challenge of convincing a large and
diverse group of investors in public equity markets, they cannot anticipate an optimal IPO
unless investors are convinced of the venture’s progress and commercial potential (e.g.,
Lerner, 1994; Chemmanur and Fulgheiri, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Ritter and Welch, 2002).
In this regard, founders with prior IPO experience gain legitimacy among seasoned
investors and startups founded by founders with prior IPO experience are likely to be
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regarded as having attractive market prospects favorable by diverse investors in public
equity markets (e.g., Berk et al., 2004; Sanders and Boivie, 2004).
Taken together, the above arguments suggest startups established by founders with
prior IPO experience are more likely to be viewed as having superior prospects by
investors, and consequently they would also be able to enjoy an earlier IPO. Thus, I posit:
Hypothesis 4.2 A founder with IPO experience on a high-tech startup’s founding team will
have a positive effect on the startup’s rate of going public.
The arguments I have developed so far suggest that startups that can credibly
convey the quality of their technical and commercial prospects would be able to go public
sooner, as they would be viewed favorably by potential investors in public markets. In
particular, in the foregoing hypotheses I argued that startup founders’ scientific and
entrepreneurial accomplishments lend credence to the technical quality and commercial
prospects of startups, and advance startups’ potential to attract outside investors. However,
the effect of our hypothesized founder credentials on the startup’s IPO rate can also be
contingent on the presence or absence of other means through which startups can credibly
convey their quality and prospects to potential public investors.
Prior research suggests that startups can rely on the prominence of their affiliations
and prior alliance partnerships in order to credibly convey their quality and prospects to
outsiders and distinguish from other startups with lesser quality ideas and prospects
suggests that (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Chang, 2004; Nicholson
et al., 2005). Given that startups are initially financed by specialized investors such as VCs,
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who focus their investments in startups operating in highly uncertain industries (e.g.,
Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990), I anticipate that the positive effects of
scientific stars and founder IPO experience to be contingent on the prominence of the
startup’s VC affiliations. Below, I develop hypotheses about the contingency between our
hypothesized founders’ credentials and prominence of startup’s VC affiliations on its rate
of going public.
4.2.3

Contingent Effect of VC Prominence
VCs are regarded as important financial intermediaries who provide capital to

startups which find it difficult to attract capital from public markets (e.g., Gompers and
Lerner, 2001). VCs overcome informational problems by gathering as much information
as possible about startups, perform due diligence, and periodically evaluate startups’
prospects (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995). So, outside investors can infer much about
the quality of prospective startups based on the quality of startups’ VC affiliations (e.g.,
Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). Startups can indicate their quality to and
alleviate risks for potential public investors through the quality of their VC affiliations.
Specifically, startups that are backed by prominent VCs are more likely to be regarded as
less uncertain and having superior prospects for achieving success.
Prior research in strategy and finance (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart et
al., 1999) shows that affiliating with prominent VCs helps startups lessen concerns of
potential public investors about the hidden aspects of startups’ technologies and their
expected future value (e.g., Gulati and Higgins, 2003). From an outside investor’s
perspective certifications of prominent VCs are likely to be credible because prominent
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VCs perform extensive due diligence to safeguard their reputation (e.g., Megginson and
Weiss, 1991; Hsu, 2004).
Prominent VCs are established in the industry and tend to invest in a startup only
there are indications that the startup is doing well and shows good prospects (e.g., Lerner,
1994). Moreover, prominent VCs are well connected with other VCs in the industry and
use their network to gather extensive information about the potential startup’s technology
and assess its prospects before committing capital (e.g., Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).
Furthermore, in addition to lending capital and monitoring progress, prominent VCs also
support startups with extra-financial services such as helping them in recruiting human
capital and connecting them with potential collaborators (e.g., Bygrave and Timmons,
1992; Hellmann and Puri, 2000, 2002; Ozmel et al., 2013). Prominent VC affiliations
enable startups establish commercialization agreements with incumbent firms (Hsu, 2006).
Broadly, startups with prominent VC backing are more likely to possess superior quality
resources and prospects for success, and also better positioned to access outside resources.
Consequently, outside investors would consider startups backed by prominent VCs less
risky and having bright prospects for success.
Whereas the above ideas suggest that prominent VC backing reduces uncertainty
for potential outside investors, startups backed by less prominent VCs are likely to be
viewed as inferior by potential investors. However, while prominent VC backing may be
sufficient for startups to convey their quality to outsiders, even in its absence startups’
chances for accessing resources for growth from external resource providers and public
markets are likely to be bright. In particular, startups can be positive about attracting
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outside investors when they are endowed with easily accessible firm-level endowments
that can substitute for prominent VC affiliations. As suggested in previous hypotheses (H1
and H2), founders with scientific star credentials and prior IPO experience can be
substantial in demonstrating the inherent worth of startups’ ideas and technologies for
prospective investors. Further, startups founded by scientific stars and successful
entrepreneurs also enjoy greater prospects for attracting commercialization opportunities
as they would also be widely known to and highly regarded by potential alliance partners,
suppliers, and customers.
Given that scientific stars and successful entrepreneurs can be effective at reducing
information asymmetry for outsiders, prominent VC affiliations would be redundant for
startups that are founded by scientific stars and founders with prior IPO experience. These
startups can rather avoid the costs of affiliating with more prominent VCs (e.g., Hsu, 2004)
and still be able to credibly convey information about their technological prospects and
capacity to commercialize their innovations. Based on the above arguments, I expect that
scientific star founders and successful founders can compensate for the lack of prominent
VC backing and enable startups a faster IPO. Thus, I posit:
Hypothesis 4.3 The positive effect of a scientific star founder on the rate of going public
will be more pronounced for a startup that is backed by less prominent
VCs.
Hypothesis 4.4 The positive effect of a startup founder’s IPO experience on the rate of
going public will be more pronounced for a startup that is backed by less
prominent VCs.
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4.3

Methods

4.3.1

Data and Sample
To test the hypotheses in this study, I formed a dataset of private venture-backed

biopharmaceutical startup firms specializing in human diagnostics and human therapeutics
that are based in the United States and founded during the 2000 to 2011 time period. Since
all the firms in our sample are VC-backed, I assembled venture level data of all the startups
in our sample from Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert database. Venture capitalists largely
focus their investments in high-technology industries such as information technology,
semi-conductors and biotechnology (e.g., Hsu, 2006) and form an important part of
biopharmaceutical startups’ financing strategy (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Zucker et al., 1998).
In addition, I identified biotech firms that filed for an IPO during our sample period from
VentureXpert data, which also includes data on the IPO of all VC-backed firms.
In this study, I theorize on the effects of founders’ IPO experience and scientific
prominence on startups’ rate of going public. I collected information about founders from
various reliable sources. Specifically, I relied on Bloomberg Businessweek, BioScan,
VentureXpert, CrunchBase, LinkedIn, company websites, and numerous web searches to
gather founders’ names and their career histories. In addition, I also used other sources
such as SEC filings, LexisNexis, and other web searches to obtain information about names
of all possible founders and their association with their firms. I only considered founders
as those individuals who had an ongoing relationship with the startup either as a company
executive, board member, or scientific advisor. In my data set, I have 763 unique founders
and 309 distinct biopharmaceutical startups. To construct other founder-level explanatory

117

and control variables, I relied on sources such as Bloomberg Businessweek, Forbes,
LinkedIn, company websites, CrunchBase, university web pages, and other web searches.
In addition, I collected data on founders’ scientific and technical publications from
Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science database.
I also obtained information about startups’ patenting activity from the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) after tracking firm histories and name changes. I also collected information about
startups’ alliance activity by using data on strategic alliances from Thomson Reuters’
Recap data base, which is considered to offer a robust representation of alliance agreements
in biopharmaceutical industry (e.g., Schilling, 2009). I collected data on startups’ drug
approvals and pipeline from Orange Book, which is a drug database organized by the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) agency.
In this study, I measure the startups’ rate of going public. While all firms in my
sample could be “at risk” of going public, some biotech startups experienced either failure
or acquisition by another firm before undertaking an IPO. I also accounted for these
possibilities and identified all the VC-backed startups in our sample that have been defunct,
or “living dead” (e.g., Ruhnka et al., 1992; Mason and Harrison, 2002) during our period
of observation using VentureXpert database. I supplemented VentureXpert database with
SDC’s Mergers and Acquisition database, and assembled the universe of all acquisitions
that occurred during 2000-2011. In this manner, I identified 18 startups that became defunct
or “living-dead”, and 97 startups that were acquired during 2000-2011. I controlled for
these events in the final construction of the sample and right-censored on the date they
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became defunct or “living-dead”, or were acquired. Of the remaining 194 startups, 36
startups experienced IPOs prior to the end of 2011, and the remaining 158 startups were
right censored at the end of this year. I concluded my analysis in 2011, because I did not
have data on some of the explanatory variables (patenting and VC variables) employed in
this study beyond that time. After accounting for missing values, my final sample for
analysis contains 2,912 observations for 309 startups.
4.3.2 Measures and Analysis
Dependent variable
The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of founders’ scientific
prominence and IPO experience on startups’ IPO hazard rate. Specifically, in this paper I
am interested in modeling a startup’s instantaneous rate of going public. My analysis
employs Cox proportional hazard models with time-varying regressors to estimate the
hazard rate of going public for a startup. Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) is
widely used for survival analysis, and incorporates a hazard rate specification that is
continuous-time with an arbitrary baseline hazard rate and multiplicative term with
exponentiated regressors (Lancaster, 1990). The model that we estimate for hazard rate of
IPO for startup i can be written as:
δ𝑖𝑖,IPO (t) = δ0 (t) ∗ exp(α𝑖𝑖 + βX𝑖𝑖t + γY𝑖𝑖t + ϵZt )

(1)

where δ0(t) represents the unspecified baseline hazard rate, αi is a vector of timeinvariant characteristics of startup i such as founding team characteristics, Xit is a vector
of time-varying measures of startup i, Yit is a vector of time-varying measures of venture
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activity of startup i, and Zt is a vector of time-varying environmental conditions, and α,β,γ,
and δ are parameters to be estimated. Because there could be situations in my data where
more than one firm might have experienced an IPO, I used Efron’s method (Efron, 1977;
Hertz-Picciotto and Rockhill, 1997) for handling tied events as it adjusts for risk sets in the
analysis using probability weights for each subsequent failure and is considered a closer
approximation to the exact partial likelihood function (Cleves, 208). I used robust standard
errors clustered by startups. In supplemental analyses, I performed robustness checks of
our results using other specifications such as Weibull and exponential hazard functions,
and our estimates are consistent across these models. In supplemental analyses, I also
investigated startups’ instantaneous risk of being acquired and found similar results are
those presented below for startups’ hazard rate of going public.
Independent Variables
The first hypothesis in this study posited that the hazard rate of going public is
positively related to Scientific Stars in the startup’s founding team. Prior research has
operationalized this variable in different ways. Zucker and Darby (1996) identified
scientific stars on the basis of number of scientific articles published until 1990 that
reported the discovery of at least one among the 40 genetic sequences. Rothaermel and
Hess (2007) constructed a measure of star scientists by compiling publication and citation
information for all scientists working at various pharmaceutical firms in their sample, and
identified stars as those who had received citations at least two standard deviations above
the mean. Higgins, Stephan, and Thursby (2011) defined star scientists as university-
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affiliated researchers who are scientifically accomplished, and they did so by identifying
university scientists who won a Nobel Prize.
Considering these differences in defining star scientists based upon the focus and
time frame of previous studies, I followed Rothaermel and Hess (2007) since this measure
is operationalizable across the long sequence of founders’ publication activity and startups’
innovative activity in my sample. I searched for publication data of all 1279 founders in
my sample using the Web of Science database and identified publications for each founder
by mapping their name, scientific field of study, and list of affiliated organizations. By
matching in this way, I developed publication and citation data for 614 founders who
published scientific articles in fields related to biotechnology, pharmaceutical sciences, and
medical sciences. The average number of scientific publications is 145 and the average
number of citations that founders received for their scientific publications is 11781. I
operationalized Scientific Star as the number of founders of a startup firm who had been
cited more than one standard deviation above the mean of the natural logarithm of the
number of citations during the 12-year span in our sample. There are 97 star scientists in
our entire sample of founders. I also performed robustness checks by constructing this
measure using different cutoff values (e.g., above the mean and different percentiles (90th
and 95th) and found the results to be robust. I also investigated an indicator variable that
captures whether or not a star scientist is a founder of the firm and obtained similar
interpretations.
Hypothesis 2 posited that the hazard rate of going public is positively related to
Founder IPO Experience of founders in the startup’s founding team. I measured Founder
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IPO Experience as the number of founders who took public at least one of their previously
founded startup in the biopharmaceutical industry (e.g., Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). I also
investigated an indicator variable that captures whether or not a startup has a founder with
prior IPO experience and obtained similar interpretations.
In Hypotheses 3 and 4, I posited that the positive effect of startup founders’
scientific and entrepreneurial credentials would be more pronounced when there is
uncertainty about the technical and commercial prospects of the startup. Previous research
in strategy, management, and finance literature suggests that the prominence of startups’
VC backing reduces uncertainty for potential investors, partners, and customers (e.g.,
Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999; Zhang, 2004; Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al.,
2013). I measured VC Prominence as the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality of
the most central VC backing the startup prior to the year t (e.g., Bonacich, 1987; Sorenson
and Stuart, 2001). More specifically, I calculated the eigenvector centrality of each VC
backing the firm within the VC syndication network, in order to capture the direct and
indirect ties among venture capitalists at a given point in time (Bonacich, 1987). I defined
the centrality of a VC firm, indexed by i, as the Bonacich two-parameter measure in year t
using a five-year time window between t-5 and t:
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
VC firm centralityi,t (Ci,t) = ∑𝑗𝑗=1
�𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡

(2)

where Cj,t is the centrality score of VC firm j in year t, and Ri,j,t is an element of the
relationship matrix Rt, indicating the co-investments between VC firms i and j during the
five year window. αt is a scale parameter chosen so that the sum of the squares of
centralities of all firms in a network in a given year equals the number of units in the
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network (i.e., Nt). βt is a weighting coefficient, indicating the effect of centralities of
investment partners on the firm’s centrality and is conventionally set to three-fourths of the
reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of the relationship matrix Rt
Control Variables
I also controlled for several variables that account for characteristics of the
founding team, startup firm, and overall biotech market conditions. To begin with, I
controlled for the number of founders in the startup’s founding team with entrepreneurial
experience. I measured Founders Prominent Firm as the number of founders who had
worked at prominent biopharmaceutical firms.
Previous research in strategy, management, and finance literature suggests that
venture capital financing is strongly related to product market strategies of startups (e.g.,
Hellman and Puri, 2000), and the amount of pre-IPO, private equity raised by a startup is
a good indicator of the level of uncertainty surrounding its technical progress and
commercial prospects (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Stuart et al.,
1999). I measure VC Funding as the cumulative amount of VC funding received by the
startup prior to the year t. I also measured VC Rounds to control for the number of rounds
of VC investment experienced by the startup prior to year t.
Technological capabilities and the quality of a startup also determine a startup’s
ability to develop innovative products and the quality of its proposed projects (e.g., Stuart,
2000), as well as opportunities for going public (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999). I controlled for
the startup’s technological assets and measured Patent Stock as the count of patents issued
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to the startup prior to year t, and Patent Citations as the natural logarithm of the total
number of citations received by startup’s issued patents prior to year t (e.g., Jaffee et al.,
1993; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005). Moreover, a startup’s drug pipeline demonstrates
its R&D productivity and technological accomplishments and conveys information to
outsiders about its commercial prospects (e.g., DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999). I measured
Biotech Drug Pipeline as the number of applications for new molecules and drugs of the
startup that were approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prior to year t.
I also controlled for alliance activity of the startup firm, because the number of
alliances formed by the startup is indicative of the fact that startup has access to these
external resources and was subject to evaluations by alliance partners (e.g., Stuart et al.,
1999; Stuart, 2000). I measured Alliance Experience as the natural logarithm of the number
of strategic alliances formed by the startup prior to year t. To account for the startup’s
development and commercialization experience, I measured Exploitative Experience as the
natural logarithm of the number of development and commercial alliances formed by the
startup prior to year t. In addition to the above variables, I also controlled for Firm Age as
the age of the firm at year t. I also controlled for industry subgroup effects and measured
Biotech Research as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the startup belongs to biotech
research category, and Biotech Human equal to 1 if it belongs to biotech human category,
with the pharmaceutical category as the baseline.
I also included several measures to control for overall biotech market conditions. I
measured Biotech IPO Intensity as the number of new biotech IPOs that occurred in year t. I
also controlled for the density of VC-backed biotech startups and measured Biotech Firm
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Density as the number of biotech firms that are at risk of an IPO in year t. In addition, I
also controlled for overall public equity market conditions for biotech firms (e.g., Lerner
and Merges, 1998) and measured Biotech Equity Index as the annual average Nasdaq
Biotechnology Index. Finally, I also controlled for fixed effects of biotechnology clusters
(Biotech Cluster Effects) (e.g., Deeds, DeCarolis, and Coombs, 1997) and included Year
Effects.
4.4

Results
In my sample, the average value for founder’s IPO experience is 0.27 for startups

that experienced an IPO, while it is 0.09 for startups that did not have an IPO (p<0.001).
The mean value number of founders with IPO experience is 0.23 for a startup that
experienced an IPO within the first three years of founding, while it is 0.10 for another that
did not have an IPO (p<0.05). The average number of scientific stars is 0.53 for startups
that experienced an IPO, while it is 0.44 for startups that did not go public (p<0.1). The
mean number of scientific stars is 0.85 for a startup that had an IPO within the first three
years of founding, whereas it is 0.48 for a startup without an IPO (p<0.05). For a startup
founded by a founder with IPO credential the hazard rate is enhanced by 244 percent,
whereas for a startup founded by a scientific star the rate of going public increases by 58
percent. However, on a relative scale, the effect of a founder with IPO experience on the
hazard rate is twofold more pronounced than that of a scientific star, suggesting that a
founder with prior IPO experience is more influential than a scientific star on a startup’s
rate of going public. Table 4.1 provides additional descriptive statistics and correlations for
my sample. Overall the correlations suggest no multicollinearity concerns. The maximum
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Table 4.2. Estimates for COX Proportional Hazard Modela
Variables
Year Effectsa
Biotech Cluster Effectsa
Biotech Research
Biotech Human
Firm Age
Exploitative Experience
Alliance Experience
Patent Citations
Patent Stock
Biotech Drug Pipeline
Biotech Equity Index
Biotech Firm Density
Biotech IPO Intensity
VC Rounds
VC Funding
VC Prominence
Founder Prominent Firm

1
4.17
1.60
0.759
(0.752)
-0.377
(0.527)
-0.532***
(0.124)
0.584
(0.780)
1.195**
(0.396)
-0.330
(0.349)
0.106*
(0.050)
0.248***
(0.068)
7.041†
(4.035)
0.242†
(0.142)
0.088
(0.057)
0.240**
(0.091)
0.110
(0.097)
-0.164
(0.427)
-0.408
(0.468)

Scientific Stars
Founder IPO Experience

Log likelihood
Wald χ2

-209.54
311.14***

2
4.16
0.62
0.642
(0.671)
-0.371
(0.464)
-0.552***
(0.141)
0.687
(0.610)
1.102***
(0.325)
-0.291
(0.267)
0.104*
(0.041)
0.295***
(0.087)
6.751
(4.443)
0.231
(0.162)
0.090†
(0.046)
0.285**
(0.100)
0.095
(0.076)
-0.468
(0.579)
-0.123
(0.350)
0.458*
(0.230)
1.236**
(0.416)
-205.07
302.78***

N=2,912. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. bχ2 values for joint significance of
fixed effects. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1.
a
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variance inflation factor is 3.36, which is well below the rule of thumb value of ten used to
indicate multicollinearity concerns (Neter et al., 1989).
Table 4.2 reports the Cox proportional hazard estimates for IPO rate. Model 1 is
the baseline model consisting of all the control variables. Model 2 augments model 1 and
shows the effects of our hypothesized variables. In the first hypothesis, I predicted that a
startup founded by a scientific star is at a greater risk of experiencing an IPO. Consistent
with this prediction, the coefficient estimate of scientific star is positive and statistically
significant (p<0.05). I also estimated the economic significance of a scientific star founder
on the rate of going public. With all the other covariates at their mean values, a startup that
has a scientific star on its founding team is 1.6 times more likely to experience an IPO
compared to another that does not have a scientific star. In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that a
startup established by a founder with prior IPO experience is at a higher risk of going
public. The coefficient estimate of founder IPO experience is positive and statistically
significant (p<0.01). The effect is also economically meaningful, as we find that an average
startup having a founder with IPO experience on its founding team is 3.4 times more at risk
of experiencing an IPO compared to another average startup that does not have founders
with IPO experience.
Table 4.3 presents Cox hazard estimates for the interactions of scientific stars and
founder IPO experience with VC prominence, respectively. Specifically, Hypothesis 3
suggests that the positive effect of scientific stars on the IPO rate will be contingent on the
prominence of startup’s VC affiliations, and more pronounced when the startup’s VC
backing is less prominent.
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Table 4.3. Interaction Effects between Founders’ Credentials and VC
Prominencea
Variables
Year Effectsb
Biotech Cluster Effectsb
Biotech Research
Biotech Human
Firm Age
Exploitative Experience
Alliance Experience
Patent Citations
Patent Stock
Biotech Drug Pipeline
Biotech Equity Index
Biotech Firm Density
Biotech IPO Intensity
VC Rounds
VC Funding
VC Prominence
Founder Prominent Firm
Scientific Stars
Founder IPO Experience
Scientific Stars*VC Prominence
Founder IPO Experience*VC
Prominence

1
4.16
0.62
0.642
(0.671)
-0.371
(0.464)
-0.552***
(0.141)
0.687
(0.610)
1.102***
(0.325)
-0.291
(0.267)
0.104*
(0.041)
0.295***
(0.087)
6.751
(4.443)
0.231
(0.162)
0.090†
(0.046)
0.285**
(0.100)
0.095
(0.076)
-0.468
(0.579)
-0.123
(0.350)
0.458*
(0.230)
1.236**
(0.416)

2
4.25
1.35
0.604
(0.815)
-0.414
(0.543)
-0.544***
(0.123)
0.714
(0.753)
1.139**
(0.360)
-0.232
(0.295)
0.100*
(0.045)
0.315***
(0.074)
6.683†
(3.912)
0.228
(0.140)
0.091
(0.058)
0.275**
(0.091)
0.082
(0.094)
0.066
(0.481)
-0.105
(0.430)
0.570*
(0.239)
1.304**
(0.494)
-0.393**
(0.131)

3
4.13
0.85
0.949
(0.755)
-0.430
(0.562)
-0.537***
(0.124)
0.521
(0.771)
1.248***
(0.376)
-0.255
(0.309)
0.103*
(0.047)
0.307***
(0.075)
6.376†
(3.860)
0.218
(0.139)
0.095
(0.058)
0.268**
(0.091)
0.087
(0.091)
0.010
(0.426)
-0.125
(0.447)
0.572*
(0.250)
1.186**
(0.441)
-0.544*
(0.220)

4
4.15
1.22
0.837
(0.786)
-0.408
(0.556)
-0.533***
(0.123)
0.563
(0.750)
1.222***
(0.371)
-0.237
(0.298)
0.102*
(0.046)
0.315***
(0.076)
6.460†
(3.911)
0.220
(0.140)
0.094
(0.058)
0.255**
(0.090)
0.087
(0.091)
0.280
(0.488)
-0.136
(0.453)
0.582*
(0.234)
1.265**
(0.456)
-0.314*
(0.159)
-0.451†
(0.267)

Log likelihood
-205.07
-202.55
-202.26
-201.35
Wald χ2
302.78***
286.09***
277.49***
269.56***
a
b 2
N=2,912. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. χ values for joint significance of
fixed effects. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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The interaction between scientific stars and VC prominence is negative and statistically
significant (p<0.01) and consistent with the prediction. Likewise, Hypothesis 4 posited a
substitution effect between founder IPO experience and the prominence of VCs affiliating
with the focal startup. Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient estimate of the
interaction variable is negative and statistically significant (p<0.05).
It is well recognized that interpreting interaction effects for nonlinear models such as Cox
proportional hazard models is difficult. I examined the interaction effects graphically
(please see Figures 4.1 and 4.2) to illustrate the interaction effects.

Figure 4.1. Interaction Effect between Scientific Stars and VC Prominence on IPO
Hazard Rate
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Figure 1 shows the interaction effect between scientific stars and VC prominence.
A one standard deviation decrease in VC prominence augments the positive effect of
founder IPO experience on IPO rate by 16 percent. Figure 2 depicts the interaction effect
between founder IPO prominence and VC prominence. A one standard deviation decrease
in VC prominence augments the positive effect of founder IPO experience on IPO rate by
27 percent.

Figure 4.2. Interaction Effect between Founder IPO Experience and VC Prominence on
IPO Hazard Rate

In supplemental analyses, I employed alternative specifications such as Weibull and
exponential hazard functions and observed similar inferences as those presented above.
Supplemental analyses of time-to-IPO using Tobit models suggested that startups founded
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by scientific stars and founders with prior IPO experience undergo IPOs sooner that other
startups. In supplemental analyses, I also investigated startups’ instantaneous risk of being
acquired and found similar results as those presented above for startups’ hazard rate of
going public. Results for some of the control variables are also noteworthy. The coefficient
estimate for patent stock is positive and significant (p<0.05). This result provides support
for the informational role of patents in enabling a startup go to IPO faster. It is also
interesting to note that the coefficient estimate of startup’s drug pipeline is positive and
significant (p<0.001), suggesting that startups that accumulated demonstrable product
development expertise are at a greater risk of going public.
4.5

Discussion

4.5.1

Contributions and Implications
In this study, I develop hypotheses about the role of founders’ distinct credentials

and track records on startups’ rate of going public. I focus on the startups’ IPO event,
because going IPO is a significant milestone for startups as it enables startups raise capital
to finance their projects and advertises to the broader community of resource providers,
suppliers, alliance partners, and customers.
In the hypotheses, I propose two distinct credentials of startup founders and suggest
that they play a pivotal role in positively influencing the startup’s rate of going public.
Specifically, I suggest that startups founded by scientific stars and founders with prior IPO
experience, respectively, achieve faster IPO rate. Given that high-tech startups are
generally backed by venture capitalists (VCs) (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner,
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2001), the quality of startups’ VC affiliations produce information on the startups’ overall
quality and market prospects for outsiders (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins,
2003; Hsu, 2004). Thus, I also suggest that founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials are more substantial when startup lack other potential means through which
they can credibly indicate their overall prospects. In particular, I argue that the positive
effect of the hypothesized founder credentials on startups’ rate of going public will be more
pronounced for startups that are backed by less prominent VCs.
At a broad level, I extend research in strategy and entrepreneurship on startups’
IPO timing decisions and IPO performance. Prior research has investigated the role of
startups’ interorganizational relationships and endorsements (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999;
Chang, 2004), top management team’s experience (e.g., Beckman and Burton, 2008) and
prestige (e.g., Certo et al., 2001) on the IPO timing and performance of startups. I
complement this stream of research by showing how specific aspects of founders’
credentials that are indicative of their scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments are
likely to have a strong bearing on startups’ IPO decision.
Second, I also contribute to research applying signaling theory to examine the
different types of signals that enable performance for new ventures in several market
contexts. Prior research (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Chang, 2004) showed how
interorganizational relationships and endorsements affect IPO timing and performance of
startups by conveying their quality to potential public investors. I complement this stream
of research by showing how distinct track records of founders play an instrumental role in
shaping IPO decisions for startups and enable a faster IPO. By investigating the
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contingency between founders’ credentials and startups’ quality of VC affiliations on
startups’ rate of going public, I contribute to prior research which suggests the relationship
between the different signals in determining outcomes for startups in various market
contexts. (e.g., Riley, 2001; Long, 2002; Certo, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Zhang and Wiersema,
2009; Connelly et al., 2011).
Third, I contribute to research in strategy and entrepreneurship on startups’ IPO
timing decisions and IPO performance. Prior research investigated the role of startups’
interorganizational relationships and endorsements (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Chang, 2004),
top management team’s experience (e.g., Beckman and Burton, 2008) and prestige (e.g.,
Certo et al., 2001) on the IPO timing and performance of startups. I extend this stream of
research by showing specific aspects of founders’ credentials that are likely to have a strong
bearing on startups’ IPO decision and their contingent effects on quality of startups’ VC
affiliations.
Finally, I also contribute to research on resource-based theory (RBT) (e.g., Penrose,
1959; Wernefelt, 1984) and resource based view (e.g., Barney 1991) and complement
emerging stream of research about the role of founders’ experience and human capital (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Chandler and Hanks,
1998). In particular, I demonstrate that credentials of founders can also be instrumental as
valuable initial “endowments” for startups (Brush et al., 2001) and accelerate their growth
and evolution towards becoming public firms.
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4.5.2

Limitations and Future Research Directions
There are several limitations to this study which future research might be able to

address. First, in this study I focus on two distinct aspects of founders’ track records, that
is scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments of founders, which I believe contribute
to startups internal growth and ability to raise capital from outside sources to finance their
projects. While micro-level data on founding team is one limitation of this study, it will be
interesting to examine how the above credentials of founders interact with other kinds of
founder attributes such as their networks, prior affiliations with prominent firms, specific
kinds of experience such as marketing and commercialization experience (e.g., Beckman
et al., 2007; Beckman and Burton, 2008).
Second, in this study I suggest that founders’ scientific as well as entrepreneurial
credentials convey information about the quality of startups’ prospects. In future research
it will be valuable to investigate how their effect on startups’ rate of going public varies
with other aspects of startups such as patents, product pipelines and so forth.
Third, while this study examines how founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial
credentials are contingent on startups’ venture progress and quality of VC affiliations, it
is also silent about how founders’ credentials interact with other endorsements besides VCs
(e.g., Stuart et al., 1999). In future research it will be useful to investigate how founders’
credentials, startup’s interorganizational networks, relationships with underwriters, and
technological prominence interact with each other in shaping outcomes for startups in
various market contexts.
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4.6

Conclusion
In this study, I investigate the role of founders’ distinct credentials and track records

on startups’ rate of going public. In particular, I propose two distinct credentials of startup
founders which separately signal founders’ unobservable scientific and entrepreneurial
human capital, and suggest that they play a pivotal role in positively influencing the
startup’s rate of going public. Specifically, I suggest that startups founded by scientific
stars and founders with prior IPO experience, respectively, achieve faster IPO rate. I also
argue and show that founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial credentials are more
substantial when startup lack other potential means, such as prominent VC affiliations,
through which they can credibly indicate their overall prospects to potential outside
investors.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I provide new insights about the role of founders in the growth and
performance of young high-tech startups. I present three studies which focus on strategies
and outcomes for high-tech startups that facilitate their commercialization and overall
growth prospects. The three studies draw upon ideas from the economics of information
about the risk of adverse selection and its remedies in various market contexts and examine
the signaling value of founders’ distinct credentials for startups in advancing the growth
and performance of startups. The studies are also unified by a common focus on the role
of founders’ distinct credentials in shaping success for startups in cooperative
commercialization agreements and initial public offerings, which are significant
developmental milestones for startups. I depart from prior literature in strategy and
entrepreneurship about the role of startup founders on startups’ performance, and rather
advance the idea that startup founders’ distinctive human capital has a much broader role
for startups in the context of startups’ strategic alliances and financing strategies. I argue
that while a founder’s human capital is private information, potential collaborators and
investors in alliance and capital markets can learn about founders’ human capital by
evaluating their career track records and accomplishments. In particular, I conceptually
distinguish features of startup founders into distinct credentials which function as credible
signals of founders’ unobservable scientific and entrepreneurial human capital, and
investigate their impact on the performance of young high-tech startups in the market for
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ideas and initial public offerings. Further, I also examine the contingent effects of these
credentials of startup founders on the degree of uncertainty that prevails for potential
alliances partners and investors about startups’ underlying quality. The three studies in this
dissertation also have broad implications for startups. Evidence across the three studies
suggests that high-tech startups having individuals with prominent credentials on their
founding team enjoy a competitive advantage relative to other startups.
5.1

Summary of Findings
The first study (Chapter 2) proposes three distinct credentials of startup founders

and explores their impact on startups’ alliance formation in the context of market for ideas
and technologies. Early stage startups typically try to obtain resources from external agents
(e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Shane and Cable, 2002) and are devoid of track records (e.g.,
Shane and Stuart, 2002) that enhance their visibility and establish credibility to resource
providers. In this regard, I unpack three distinct credentials of startup founders -- scientific
stars, employees of prominent incumbents, and successful founders -- that are costly for
other founders to attain and which enable transactions with firms by reducing their costs of
search and selection. Further, I develop the argument that the impact of founders’
credentials is contingent on other signals that can effectively convey the underlying quality
of startups’ quality to potential collaborators and mitigate uncertainty. I find evidence that
a startup’s published patent application diminishes the positive effect of founders’
credentials on formation of cooperative agreements with incumbents. This paper
contributes to research on alliances and collaborative R&D partnerships (e.g., Stuart, 1998;
Gulati. 1999), by suggesting that founders’ credentials play an important role in addressing
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information asymmetries and reducing risks of adverse selection faced by incumbent firms
and enabling transactions with upstream suppliers of technologies.
The second study (Chapter 3) examines an underexplored dimension of alliance
contracting, in particular the payment structures that parties negotiate for their high-tech
partnerships, and develops hypotheses about the remedial role of startup founders’
credentials in obtaining favorable payment structures for startups during collaborative
commercialization with incumbents. Specifically, I investigate two distinct credentials of
startup founders and argue that they play an instrumental role in positively shaping the
proportion of upfront payments that startups can obtain from their licensees, rather than
deferred and contingent payments that routinely feature in these transactions. More
importantly, I provide evidence for the intuitive notion that the two distinct founders’
credentials – star founders and successful founders – would complement each other.
Finally, I also suggest that the positive effects of these two distinct founders’ credentials
on the proportion of upfront payments that startups receive will vary based upon startups’
venture development stages. At a broad level, this study contributes to literature in strategy
and entrepreneurship by examining the signaling role of founders’ credentials in enhancing
the value attained from their ideas and innovative capabilities from cooperative
commercialization arrangements.
In the third study (Chapter 4) I develop hypotheses about the role of founders’
credentials on startups’ rate of going public. I propose that startup founders’ scientific and
entrepreneurial credentials play a pivotal role in positively influencing the startup’s ability
to go public. Specifically, I suggest that startups that have a scientific star or a founder with
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prior IPO experience on their founding team are able to go public faster. I also suggest that
the effects of founders’ scientific and entrepreneurial credentials are contingent on other
potential means through which startups can credibly convey their overall quality and
prospects. Notably, given the fact that high-tech startups are generally backed by venture
capitalists (VCs) (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) and the quality of their
VC affiliations produce information on startups’ quality, I suggest that prominent VC
affiliations moderate the effects of founders’ credentials on startup’s rate of going public.
This study complements previous research on startups’ IPO timing decisions and IPO
performance by showing how specific aspects of founders’ credentials that are indicative
of their scientific and entrepreneurial accomplishments are likely to have a strong bearing
on startups’ IPO decision.
5.2 Implications for Future Research
Overall, this research sheds new light about the significance of founders in shaping
the performance as well as growth prospects of startups. Research in entrepreneurship
suggests that startup founders’ knowledge, skills, experience, know-how and expertise are
part of startups’ initial endowments, and critically determine the performance and survival
of startups (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994). A large body of research in strategy strongly suggests
that startups largely rely on strategic alliances with incumbent firms and investors to access
complementary resources and capital to promote startups’ growth and performance (e.g.,
Pisano, 1989; Gulati, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Baum and
Silverman, 2004). Given the significance of founders in shaping startups’ strategic growth
and development, there is a need for understanding how and to what extent founders affect
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outcomes for startups in important strategic contexts, such as strategic alliances and initial
public offerings.
From a theoretical standpoint, the arguments and evidence in this study suggest that
founders’ superior credentials serve as credible signals for the quality of their unobservable
human capital and function as effective means for reducing adverse selection risks for
incumbent partners and investors. In this regard, this study is one of the first to provide
systematic evidence about the role of founders in accomplishing growth prospects for
startups though strategic alliances and initial public offerings. However, the focus of this
dissertation is also necessarily limited. I suggest a few valuable research opportunities that
are possible by combining the insights from this study with prior literature to examine some
interesting questions.
For instance, while a part of this study explored how founders’ credentials shape
formation of alliance agreements as well as payment structures for startups in these
agreements, it is silent on the structure and design of these agreements between startups
and incumbents. Prior research emphasizes the role of hierarchical governance structures
in mitigating partners’ concerns about behavioral uncertainty as well as coordination costs
(e.g., Gulati and Singh, 1998). Even though we suggested that founders’ credentials
reduces risk of adverse selection for alliance partners, it is also likely that superior
credentials produce reputation effects for founders and reduce the need for stronger
hierarchical governance structures such as equity alliances (e.g., Williamson, 1991). Also,
given the fact that a large component of founders’ human capital is tacit in nature and very
valuable for partners in the collaborative development of startups’ specific ideas (e.g.,
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Polanyi, 1966), partner firms would also prefer to employ more hierarchical structures
(e.g., Kogut, 1988). Therefore, a logical extension of this study is to understand how
different credentials of founders influence the design and choice of governance structure
for cooperative commercialization agreements of startups.
In this dissertation, I show that founders’ credentials function as signals of their
unobservable human capital and reduce adverse selection risks for potential alliance
partners and investors. A notable implication of founders’ credentials for startups is that
they also create outside options for startups and expand their portfolio of potential
commercialization partners and investors. As a result, founders’ superior credentials
broadly enhance the attractiveness of startups and improve their bargaining power while
negotiating with collaborative commercialization partners and investors. Given the
signaling and bargaining considerations of startup founders’ credentials, it will be very
useful to examine how founders’ credentials influence the distribution of control rights and
appropriation of value for startups within cooperative commercialization agreements and
R&D alliances (e.g., Lerner and Merges, 1998; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). In future
research, it will also be fruitful to examine the effect of founders’ credentials in other
contexts such as Mergers and Acquisitions, which are also valuable strategic milestones
for startups.
In summary, across these three studies I show that founders’ distinct technical and
entrepreneurial credentials facilitate important milestones for startups, such as strategic
alliances and initial public offering, which ensure startups’ growth and survival. I also show
the contingent effects of these credentials of startup founders on the degree of uncertainty
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that prevails for potential alliances partners and investors about startups’ underlying
quality. Put together, the three studies provide new evidence about the signaling role of
startup founders’ credentials and enhance the theoretical and empirical understanding
about the role of founders in shaping growth prospects and performance of startups.
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